A Few Grains of Incense: Law, Religion, and Politics From the Perspective of the  Christian  and  Pagan  Dispensations by Paul Horwitz
Journal of Catholic Legal Studies 
Volume 58 
Number 1 Volume 58 Article 12 
A Few Grains of Incense: Law, Religion, and Politics From the 
Perspective of the "Christian" and "Pagan" Dispensations 
Paul Horwitz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcls 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Catholic Legal Studies by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
	
125 
ARTICLE 
A FEW GRAINS OF INCENSE: 
LAW, RELIGION, AND POLITICS FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE “CHRISTIAN” AND 
“PAGAN” DISPENSATIONS 
PAUL HORWITZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
 The pleasures of reading Steven D. Smith’s writing are varied 
and immense.  That certainly holds true for his substantial new book, 
Pagans and Christians in the City.1  As with so much of his work, 
Smith’s argument is presented simply and calmly, and with such 
mild wit and irony as to be seductive.  Yet there is no question that 
in this book as elsewhere, Smith is unafraid of, and even courts, 
disagreement and controversy.2  With a book as seemingly 
panoptic as this,3 the real challenge is deciding which part of the 
book to push and poke at. 
 
† Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. Thank you to 
St. John’s University School of Law and the Journal of Catholic Legal Studies for the 
opportunity to participate in a symposium in February 2019 on Steven Smith’s book, 
to the journal editors for their help and patience, and to Steven D. Smith and the other 
participants for comments. I am grateful to John Witte, Silas Allard, and Emory Law 
School’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion for the opportunity to present a 
draft of this paper in the winter of 2019 during my stint as a visiting fellow there and 
to Silas Allard, Major Coleman, Gordon Govens, Justin Latterell, Audra Savage, and 
Anton Sorkin for feedback. 
1 STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM 
THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018). 
2 Smith thus has something in common with the eminently readable Mark 
Tushnet, whose different perspective on the “culture wars” is mentioned twice in 
Smith’s book but arguably has a larger influence than that. See id. at 344–45, 365–
66. Moreover, Tushnet is a founding member of the Critical Legal Studies school, 
while Smith is arguably a “Crit” after his own fashion. See Paul Horwitz, More 
“Vitiating Paradoxes”: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 943, 943–47 
(2014) (proposing Smith’s inclusion in the limited ranks of “Conservative Critical 
Legal Studies”). Both writers exemplify the puckishness of the best Crit legal writing 
without the turgidity and obscurity that characterize the worst of it. 
3 I say seemingly panoptic because, for a book that seems to cover so much of 
Western religious and political history, and to apply that history to the contemporary 
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In this Essay, I expand on a key aspect of Pagans and 
Christians in the City, which features most prominently in the 
chapter on the “[l]ogic” of pagan and Christian persecution4 and is 
applied in subsequent chapters on modern America.  The question 
Smith focuses on—with an eye fixed as firmly on the present as on 
the past—is the possibility of compromise under “Christian” or 
“pagan” regimes during the Roman Empire.  Smith argues that 
from within each perspective, “peaceful and mutually respectful 
coexistence should have been possible, if only the other side would 
be less unreasonable.”5  From its point of view, each regime 
demanded little.  But from the perspective of the party asked to 
give something up, the terms of compromise could not be accepted 
“without sacrificing or betraying its own beliefs and 
commitments.”6  From this perspective, such stubborn resistance 
to even a minor degree of compromise would naturally be seen as 
demonstrating the unreasonableness and, perhaps, reactionary 
and dangerous nature of the other side. 
 
 
United States, there are surprising absences. Although Smith is clear that the terms 
“Christian” and “pagan” include other faiths, it was not until well into the book that I 
noticed just how little many faiths, Western and non-Western and certainly well 
within the universe of modern American religious pluralism, feature in his book. 
Despite making cameo appearances, faiths like Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, and Mormonism play a remarkably small role, and none appear in the 
index. “Jews and Judaism” won a spot in the index and many mentions in the text but 
are, I think, mostly incidental. For discussion, see generally Michael A. Helfand, Jews 
and the Culture Wars: Consensus and Dissensus in Jewish Religious Liberty Advocacy, 
56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305 (2019); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Jews, 
Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497 (2019). 
And although the book takes in both the Tiber and the Potomac, the ground between 
them goes unexamined. We hear nothing of Poland and Hungary, for example, both of 
which have witnessed fierce religious and political contestation in the past couple of 
years. (Some of this, to be fair, occurred after Smith had finished writing the book.) 
This omission may make a difference. Smith focuses on the United States but notes 
that “a parallel struggle is arguably occurring through much of the Western world 
(and perhaps beyond).” SMITH, supra note 1, at 260. The focus on the United States 
makes it harder to link his narrative to recent global developments concerning religion 
and politics and the broader culture wars, such as the rise of political populism, not 
just as a matter of “Trumpism” but globally; the rise of illiberalism and of newly 
energized critiques of liberalism; and the rise of religious integralism. An examination 
of these topics might support or weaken Smith’s general argument for a link between 
past and present; it might also make his prescriptions less attractive. 
4 SMITH, supra note 1, at 130. 
5 Id. at 131. 
6 Id. 
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This is a valuable and under-appreciated insight.  Of course it 
is hardly unknown.  The general meliorist tendencies of American 
legal academics and other American cultural commentators, 
however—our default desire, at least until recently, to “just get[ ] 
along,”7 to “resolv[e] or ameliorat[e] social conflict”8—may lead us 
to focus more on the purported solutions to our problems than on 
the nature of conflict itself.  And Smith’s point is precisely that the 
various proposals aimed at convincing us to “just get along” are 
part of the problem.9  Nor do the generally normative tendencies 
of American legal scholars help.  Their work often tends to treat 
descriptive work as mere prologue, a foundation for the latest 
proposed solution.  Much more can and should be said about the 
problems themselves, without feeling any need to offer a solution. 
I pursue that aim here.  My goal is neither to praise nor to 
bury Smith’s argument, but to expand on it.  Smith’s basic point—
that both sides in the current culture wars, like those in the 
“culture wars” between Christians and pagans, propose what they 
consider only small sacrifices, which from the other party’s 
perspective are actually unacceptable and dangerous—merits 
further discussion.10  Smith’s point suggests that in the areas of 
both religious free exercise and nonestablishment, the contest 
between offers of compromise seen by each side as “reasonable” 
has been an important part of our current disagreements.  
Although this Essay is structured around Smith’s book, it 
ultimately uses the book as a jumping-off point.  My broader goal 
is to explore the role that the logic of persecution plays in the 
current disputes within American law and religion scholarship 
and jurisprudence, and much of American society beyond that. 
My aim here is mostly descriptive.  It is more focused on what 
one might call the sociology and political economy of religion and 
cultural-political conflict than on prescribing a solution to it.  My 
concern is with the how and the why of the conflicts Smith 
describes, not with their solution.  Indeed, I have strong doubts 
 
7 Id. at 157. 
8 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
839, 877 (2014). 
9 SMITH, supra note 1, at 157. 
10 See Andrew Koppelman, This Isn’t About You: A Comment on Smith’s Pagans 
and Christians in the City, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 393, 400 & n.39 (2019) (noting 
Smith’s acknowledgment that in ancient and modern culture wars “both sides are 
struggling to avoid being dominated, culturally and politically,” but arguing that 
Smith does not pursue this point sufficiently in his book). 
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that the somewhat normative view of the modern “Christian city” 
that Smith offers in his conclusion is likely to turn out as he 
describes it, or to be any more successful than the “pagan city” that 
he suggests has not proved to be “a viable basis for community 
under current circumstances.”11 
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I describes Smith’s 
account of the dilemmas of compromise and the logic of persecution.  
It is a summary section, although in it I emphasize some factors 
that may help expand on Smith’s thesis.  Parts II and III explore 
the relevance of that thesis to the current culture wars and their 
intersection with religion and American law and politics, focusing 
on free exercise and nonestablishment, respectively.  Part IV 
further supplements Smith’s account, suggesting additional details, 
factors, and dynamics that may make compromise difficult or 
impossible. 
A few notes about the boundaries of this Essay are necessary.  
First, I work within Smith’s basic account, not outside or against 
it.  There is certainly room to question both Smith’s account of 
“pagans” and “Christians” in ancient Rome and its application to 
contemporary culture.12  But I mostly take Smith’s basic account 
as a given for purposes of this Essay.  Except insofar as they affect 
my effort to expand upon and color in some of Smith’s picture, I 
put to one side doubts about his basic account of “pagans” and 
“Christians,” ancient or modern, and work within it instead.  That 
 
11 SMITH, supra note 1, at 377–78; cf. ALAN JACOBS, THE YEAR OF OUR LORD 1943: 
CHRISTIAN HUMANISM IN AN AGE OF CRISIS 79 (2018) (“Our period is not so unlike the 
age of Augustine: the planned society, caesarism of thugs or bureaucrats, paideia, 
scientia, religious persecution, are all with us. Nor is there even lacking the possibility 
of a new Constantinism; letters have already begun to appear in the press, 
recommending religious instruction in schools as a cure for juvenile delinquency; Mr. 
Cochrane’s terrifying description of the ‘Christian’ empire under Theodosius should 
discourage such hopes of using Christianity as a spiritual benzedrine for the earthly 
city.” (quoting 2 W. H. AUDEN, Augustus to Augustine, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
W.H. AUDEN: PROSE, 1939–1948 226, 231 (Edward Mendelson ed. 2002)); id. at 96–98 
(discussing Simone Weil’s argument that the dominant Christianity of the Gothic 
Middle Ages, following a period in which European Christianity “lived in the midst of, 
and peacefully tolerated, profanity and error,” ushered in a period of “totalitarian 
spirituality” that damaged Christian civilization and gave rise to movements, such as 
“nonreligious, or antireligious, humanism,” that constituted “a genuine attempt, 
however misguided and doomed to failure, to seek spiritual freedom from the 
oppression imposed by the ‘imposition of belief’ of the Gothic era” (quoting SIMONE 
WEIL, The Romanesque Renaissance, in SELECTED ESSAYS 1934–1943, at 44 (Richard 
Rees trans., 1962))). 
12 See generally Steven D. Smith, Introduction to the Symposium, 56 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 247 (2019). 
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said, as will become evident, I do not fully agree with all of his 
characterizations of the modern “pagan” or “Christian” approaches 
to free exercise or nonestablishment, and I make those doubts 
clear.  I am particularly critical—in the sense of raising critical 
questions rather than of mere disapproval—of his treatment of 
disputes concerning religious symbols. 
Second, and somewhat faute de mieux, I do not question 
Smith’s basic historical account.  It is surely capable of being 
questioned and criticized.  Any historical account is, especially one 
that takes in such a vast scope.  But, although I have some 
familiarity with the literature, that task requires someone with 
much more training in classical and early Christian history.  
Embarrassingly for a generally educated person and a scholar, I 
do not even read Latin, let alone classical Greek. 
Third, I emphasize again that my goals are primarily 
descriptive and exploratory, not prescriptive.  For present 
purposes, I am not interested in taking a strong side on the 
conflicts and compromises discussed here.  And, as Smith notes, to 
the extent that we recognize that the contending sides in our 
culture wars “are struggling to avoid being dominated, culturally 
and politically,” we might find sympathy even for those with whom 
we are inclined to disagree.13   
Finally, my primary focus is on only a few chapters of Smith’s 
book, particularly Chapters Six and Nine, with some treatment of 
Chapters Seven and Ten.  Even within these strictures, I think 
there is still considerable room to both advance and question the 
account that Smith offers. 
I. “SMALL SACRIFICES” AND THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION  
Smith’s book opens with what he sees as a puzzling question, 
one that stretches from ancient to modern times and, as it were, 
from the Tiber to the Potomac.  The question, in effect, is: Why 
bother persecuting others? 
What counts as “persecution” varies, of course.  The stakes 
involved are very different between then and now.  But there is 
some continuity in the basic question.  Why should Pliny the 
Younger bother to execute Christians in the province of Bithynia, 
putting to the sword those who openly avowed their faith or 
refused to make offerings to statues of the emperor Trajan and of 
 
13 Id. at 265 n.32. 
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the Roman gods?  Why, if they showed otherwise “innocuous or 
even laudable behavior,” apart from an “unshakeable obstinacy,” 
should they be punished?14  Why should the “rulers of the Roman 
Empire” have persisted in doing so a century later, despite the 
“Romans’ reputation for broad-minded religious toleration”?15  And 
why, in our own time, would plaintiffs in cases involving 
antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations, in which the 
services sought are “readily available from other[s]” who have no 
religious objections to providing those services, “insist on suing 
people whose services they neither need nor want?”16  Why would 
people bother “using the law to crack down on a religion or a way 
of life that they disapprove of but that doesn’t seem to be 
realistically harming them or interfering with their own lives in 
any obvious way”?17 
One can expect some fairly standard and perhaps indignant 
answers to this question.  They would invoke terms such as 
equality, equal dignity, harm to others, and so on.  These answers 
are especially likely to arise in cases in which actions or services 
are connected to the provision of government benefits or public 
goods—a category that expands the more we rely on actors in the 
marketplace, acting under the regulatory umbrella of the state, to 
provide goods such as contraceptive care rather than having the 
state provide them directly.  They will also arise in cases involving 
the capacious category of “public accommodations,” especially 
when we treat the refusal itself as the harm, regardless of whether 
substitute providers are available. 
I do not mean to belittle these important and sincere 
responses.  But one could easily imagine similar responses from a 
pagan supporter of the persecution of Christians or, later, a 
Christian supporter of the suppression of pagan practices.  The 
terms, values, and concepts invoked might differ.  Still, here too 
one might hear claims about the harms to society of these 
practices, their fundamental offensiveness to the public welfare, 
the “obstinacy” of the objectors, and so on.  One could quarrel with 
 
14 Id. at 1–3. 
15 Id. at 3–4. 
16 Id. at 6. Smith draws on the writing of Douglas Laycock here and makes clear 
that Laycock is equally happy to pose the question to the other “side,” asking why 
religious Christians would insist on “regulations of sexual activity” by others, 
including opposing the legality of same-sex marriage. Id. at 6–7; see, e.g., Laycock, 
supra note 8, at 848–51. 
17 SMITH, supra note 1, at 7. 
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the facts.  But from the standpoint of the regnant regime, its 
values, and its concern for self-preservation, the answers would 
hardly be outrageous. 
The question thus persists in both cases: Why bother?  Or at 
least, why bother if the society is otherwise ostensibly tolerant of 
religious and other differences, the individuals involved are 
otherwise obedient to the law and capable of contributing to the 
society, and the harms alleged in individual cases are not 
immediate, apparent, grave, and urgent? 
One answer to this question was provided by Justice Holmes: 
This sort of persecutory conduct is “perfectly logical.  If you have 
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result 
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and 
sweep away all opposition.”18  If your premises and your desired 
results are not painted in purely conclusory or mercenary terms 
but are imbued with a seeming spirit of public-mindedness and, at 
least in modern times, a potentially expansive vision of the 
tangible or intangible harms involved in the offending conduct, 
then suppressing that conduct seems natural, even necessary. 
Smith’s own answer is richer than that, adding important 
details missing from Holmes’s aperçu.  In particular, he offers a 
more dynamic and cyclical account of the logic of persecution.19  
His answer to the questions he poses depends not simply on the 
apparent rightness of the dominant regime but on its ostensibly 
pluralistic, accommodating nature and its willingness to 
compromise.20  From the perspective of each dominant regime—
first the “pagan” regime and then, although Smith has much less 
to say about this, the “Christian” regime—persecution was logical 
not because the other side was so terrible but because it was so 
unreasonable.  One cannot be “unshakeabl[y] obstina[te]” about 
nothing.21  There must be a “something” to be obstinate about, an 
outstretched hand that one refuses to take. 
This is how things look from the perspective of the regimes he 
discusses.  From the perspective of each regime, the other side was 
obstinate in its refusal to accept the considerable compromises 
that the regime offered, compromises that demanded at most a 
small sacrifice from the other side.  In each case, the failure from 
 
18 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
19 SMITH, supra note 1, at 151–53. 
20 Id. at 151–52. 
21 Id. at 152. 
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the dominant perspective to understand why the sacrifice was not 
seen as small led to the view that the other side was simply being 
obstinate, and in turn to the conclusion that it was “inflexible, 
dogmatic,” and “undeserving of accommodation.”22  It is this lesson 
Smith draws from history.  It is a lesson we can usefully apply to 
better understand the dynamics of current events and the factors 
that influence those dynamics. 
Begin with what Smith calls the “Christian position,” the 
compromise the early Christians offered to what was then the 
ruling regime: what I will call in this Essay the “pagan 
dispensation,” the prevailing system of order at the time.23  
According to this view, Christians “insisted that they could still be 
loyal subjects of the earthly city” despite their “ultimate 
commitment” to the “heavenly city” of God.24  They could support 
the empire’s aims, pray for its leaders and soldiers, share in its 
commerce and much of its public and social life, and pay their 
share of taxes to the state.25  They believed, and proposed to their 
rulers, “that peaceful coexistence should be possible on fair and 
mutually acceptable terms.”26 
This offer was not always rejected.  The persecution of 
Christians was hardly a constant in ancient Roman life, despite 
“spasms of frightful violence.”27  Often enough, the offer was 
accepted; but it was accepted “more [as] a matter of pragmatic 
accommodation than of agreement on principles.”28  It worked well 
enough when little was at stake or when the areas of disagreement 
were not highly visible.  The empire was accustomed to “putting 
up with all manner of exotic cults.”29 
At other times, however, the fundamental differences between 
the empire and the Christians, and the imperial perception that 
Christians posed a threat to the well-being of the regime, became 
more salient, in ways that may be relevant to contemporary 
conflicts.  It mattered that while some Christians were willing to 
engage, however perfunctorily, in ritual civic shows of loyalty to 
 
22 Id. at 153. 
23 Id. at 136. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 136–37. 
26 Id. at 136. 
27 Id. at 138 n.44 (quoting RAMSAY MACMULLEN, PAGANISM IN THE ROMAN 
EMPIRE 134 (1981)). 
28 Id. at 138. 
29 Id. at 139. 
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the empire and its pantheon, others viewed participation in such 
events as “a forbidden performance of idolatrous worship.”30  And 
“[s]ometimes the dilemma arose in connection with commercial 
activity.”31  Participation in the “authorized” marketplace required 
a willingness to engage in ritual shows of loyalty such as giving 
“specific divine honours to the Caesars.”32  The intertwinement of 
public and private, of the market and the state, made it 
“impossible [for Christians] to escape the observance of 
[polytheistic rituals], without, at times, renouncing the commerce 
of mankind, and all the offices and amusements of society.”33  
Finally, the Christian refusal to participate in certain public 
rituals, combined with their condemnation of pagan practices and 
beliefs, would have been seen as “an offense against the ‘dignity’ 
of the censured pagans.”34   
Taken together, the compromise proposed by the Christians, 
under which they would obey the law and pay their taxes but 
refuse to engage in basic public shows of loyalty that involved 
acknowledging and not criticizing the pagan gods, could not be 
accepted by the leadership of the pagan dispensation.35  The 
Christians would thus come to be seen as stubborn, unreasonable, 
and “censorious and dogmatic,” and so confirm the regime in its 
refusal to accept the compromise and make persecution more 
likely.36 
What of the pagan dispensation’s own proposals for “peaceful 
coexistence”?37  The pagan offer of compromise was essentially the 
same one that had been made to and accepted by a variety of other 
faiths within the Roman Empire,38 although those negotiations 
were surely not always voluntary.  The offer was one of “reciprocity.”  
Each side would respect each other’s deity or deities, not so much 
through mutual toleration as through absorption.39  The pagans 
would welcome God, Jesus, or both onto the roster of deities, just 
 
30 Id. at 140. 
31 Id. at 141. 
32 Id. (quoting BRUCE W. WINTER, DIVINE HONOURS FOR THE CAESARS: THE FIRST 
CHRISTIANS’ RESPONSES 286 (2015)).  
33 Id. (quoting 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF 
THE ROMAN EMPIRE 460–61 (Modern Library ed. 1995) (1776)).  
34 Id. at 149. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 150. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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as they had welcomed other gods.  In turn, the Christians would 
be expected to show respect for that roster.  Not much, from the 
pagan point of view, was required.  Whatever Christians believed 
and whoever they worshipped in their own communities, on public 
or civic occasions they would perform “small sacrificial gestures to 
the gods.”40 In Edward Gibbon’s words, “[i]f [the Christians] 
consented to cast a few grains of incense upon the altar” of the gods 
when before a public tribunal, they would be “dismissed from the 
tribunal in safety and with applause.”41  This was not much to ask, 
and might be seen as a form of “modest unity” of its time.42 
Just as the Christians, in Smith’s account, offered a 
compromise that struck them as reasonable but was unacceptable 
to the pagans, so the pagan offer, which to them “would have 
seemed inoffensive and easy to comply with,” was a non-starter for 
many Christians.43  Even if it involved only an empty ceremonial 
gesture, their monotheistic beliefs rendered the “ostensible 
reciprocity” of the pagan compromise a disingenuous “sham” to be 
rejected.44 
That refusal would encourage the pagans to view the Christians 
as “inflexible, dogmatic, and unworthy of accommodation” and 
perforce worthy of—perhaps in need of, for the sake of a well-
ordered society—persecution.45  A group that vocally rejects what 
are seen as basic norms of social reciprocity and basic sources of 
civic unity may well be seen as a threat to the existing order that 
loses any expectation of tolerant treatment.  This, then, is the 
vision of offer and counteroffer under the shadow of the pagan 
dispensation, one in which each “held out terms of mutual 
accommodation that seemed fair and reasonable to them, but that 
for discernible reasons were not—and could not be—accepted by 
the other side,” leading to suspicion and ultimately persecution.46 
Smith is less clear about conditions under the Christian 
dispensation.  He harbors no doubt that by the end of the fourth 
century, “Christianity was now officially in control; paganism was 
 
40 Id. at 151. 
41 Id. (quoting GIBBON, supra note 33, at 537–38). 
42 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH 
DEEP DIFFERENCE 15 (2018). To be clear, this is not the modest unity Inazu is thinking 
of with respect to our own time. 
43 SMITH, supra note 1, at 151. 
44 Id. at 151–52. 
45 Id. at 153. 
46 Id. at 131. 
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officially (if not in practice) banished.”47  He acknowledges that a 
leading account of how it happened describes the use of “political” 
and “coercive” measures.48  And he admits at the least that, just as 
the pagan regime sometimes persecuted Christians and sometimes 
didn’t, the Christian regime sometimes persecuted or legally 
outlawed paganism and sometimes didn’t.49  But, emphasizing the 
“disagreements among able historians,” his discussion remains 
rather inconclusive, even elusive.50 
Still, Smith gives us a good look at the details of persecution 
under both the Christian and the pagan regimes of later eras, in a 
period of greater unsettlement than had prevailed during 
Christianity’s first century, when the Roman Empire was most 
firmly entrenched.  We may be able to work backwards from that 
evidence to come up with some sense of what compromise, if any, 
the Christian dispensation offered. 
Working out of historical sequence, Smith describes 
persecution during periods of Christian rule as varied, laxly 
enforced, and often more a matter of control over civic and 
symbolic spaces than of outright repression, though he 
acknowledges that “the clear overall trend was toward the official 
elevation of Christianity and the repression of paganism.”51  
Constantine’s “imperial rigor” was more likely to be aimed at 
Christians themselves, as they underwent internecine disputes, 
than against the pagans themselves.52  Toward the latter, his 
policy was one of toleration.53  Nevertheless, under his rule 
Christianity “passed from being a persecuted to a preferred 
 
47 Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 162. It is perhaps suggestive that Smith draws heavily at the outset of 
his book on T.S. Eliot’s lectures, The Idea of a Christian Society. See id. at 8–15. Alan 
Jacobs, in his book The Year of Our Lord 1943, calls these lectures “a masterpiece of 
vagueness and evasion,” noting many “disavowals”—statements about what Eliot is 
not saying or discussing, without remedying the “obliquities” in what he does 
discuss—that form “[o]ne of the [lectures’] most persistent and curious tics.” JACOBS, 
supra note 11, at 105–06. One might make similar charges of vagueness and obliquity 
against the recent literature espousing some form of Catholic integralism—a 
literature that Smith does not associate himself with here explicitly, but that shares 
an interest in the theme of the modern “Christian City,” the possibility of which Smith 
returns to at the end of his book. SMITH, supra note 1, at 377–79.  
51 SMITH, supra note 1, at 172. 
52 Id. at 167. 
53 Id. at 166 (discussing PAUL VEYNE, WHEN OUR WORLD BECAME CHRISTIAN: 
312–394 (2010)). 
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faith.”54  He ordered some pagan temples closed and banned some 
pagan practices.  Christian churches were often built on the site of 
the former pagan places of worship.55 
Constantine’s son and successor, Constantius, forbade pagan 
sacrifices, closed more pagan temples, and set heavy punishments 
for the violation of these edicts—although these laws went largely 
unenforced and Constantius himself made “a friendly tour of 
[Rome’s] pagan temples.”56  Nevertheless, “antipagan laws and 
precedents were slowly and quietly accumulating.”57  Following an 
interlude of pagan rule, later Christian emperors, especially 
Theodosius, “adopted a harsher series of laws closing temples and 
forbidding pagan sacrifices.”58  Even when the officials were not 
strict in enforcing their laws, “mobs of militant monks and other 
faithful” sometimes took more violent action against pagans and 
their temples.59 
The pagan reaction, during a brief period of pagan rule by the 
emperor Julian following Constantius’s death in 361, was similar in 
many respects.  Julian “purport[ed] to embrace religious toleration” 
but “gave preference to pagans for high office.”60  He required the 
demolition of Christian churches that had been built over pagan 
temples.61  Perhaps most relevantly for modern purposes, Julian 
issued an edict “banning Christians from teaching in the schools 
on the grounds that, since they did not believe in the gods, they were 
morally unfit to teach the classics.”62  Quoting Adrian Murdoch, 
Smith calls this “a masterstroke,” since such a measure would 
effectively ensure that the elite would be pagan and Christians 
would remain marginalized in the halls of power and culture.63 
A key site of contestation through both Christian and pagan 
periods of rule was the struggle over public symbols.  Smith argues 
that even if Christian laws forbidding pagan practices weren’t 
always enforced, “such measures had a symbolic impact[,] . . . 
gradually [inducing] subjects to conceive of the empire in more 
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55 Id. at 167. 
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59 Id. 
60 Id. at 169. 
61 Id. 
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63 Id. at 170 (quoting ADRIAN MURDOCH, THE LAST PAGAN: JULIAN THE APOSTATE 
AND THE DEATH OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 139 (2003)). 
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Christian terms.”64  But actual symbols, and public support for 
them, were at issue more directly.  As is true today, some civic 
symbols were publicly supported and effectively represented the 
voice of the state.  “Culture wars” took place over what the state 
would say and what it would subsidize: 
[W]hen the Christian emperors of the later fourth century cut off 
funding for the support of the temples and the vestal virgins, it 
was not merely the withdrawal of material resources that 
Christians applauded and pagans resented; it was the denial of 
support that was perceived to be public in nature.65 
In ways that echo contemporary debates, the bishop of Milan, 
Ambrose, argued for denial of support in a manner that stretched 
the definition of “public” and treated even indirect state support 
as “state action.”66  Against an argument that money for pagan 
temples had originally come from private bequests, Ambrose 
counseled the emperor that the funds “had long been deemed part 
of the public treasury.”67  Whatever the “technical[ ]” facts, if the 
emperor restored those funds, “ ‘you will seem to give rather from 
your own funds,’ and thus to be giving imperial approval to pagan 
worship.”68  The Altar of Victory, a statue of the goddess by that 
name, similarly served as the object of a tug-of-war between 
pagans and Christians, alternately removed from and restored to 
its place next to the Senate House.69 
What does all this suggest about any compromises or proposals 
for “peaceful coexistence” offered to pagans by Christians when the 
latter were in power?  We have already canvassed the compromise 
offered by Christians during the pagan dispensation: Christians 
would obey the law and pay their taxes, but refuse to worship any 
pagan deities, perform pagan civic rituals, or keep silent about 
their beliefs.  But it is one thing to offer a compromise from a 
position of weakness and another to offer it from a position of 
strength.  The two deserve to be examined separately. 
 
 
64 Id. at 173–74. 
65 Id. at 174. 
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68 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting AMBROSE, EPISTLE 17 ¶ 3, https://people.ucalgary.ca/ 
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Here, Smith again offers less detail than he does concerning 
the pagan dispensation and its refusal to accept Christian offers.  
A stronger focus on the Christian emperor Theodosius—who 
imposed legal bans on pagan sacrifices and even on visiting pagan 
temples, ordered the closure of pagan temples and created the 
opportunity to build churches over them, dammed the stream of 
public support for pagan activities and institutions, and ultimately 
declared paganism a “religio illicita”—certainly suggests that the 
Christian dispensation left little room for peaceful coexistence.70  
As I have noted, however, I work from within Smith’s framework 
here, despite its lack of detail on these and other Christian 
practices during periods of Christian political supremacy.  What 
we can say on the basis of Smith’s limited narrative is that if there 
was a Christian offer of compromise, it was that paganism would 
be suffered to continue, while being officially forbidden or 
disfavored and stripped of any meaningful association with the 
state and its symbols. 
This puts things more strongly than Smith does.  For much of 
the early period of Christian dispensation, he writes, 
most temples remained open despite the laws, statues and 
images of the gods stared down from every corner of the cities, 
public sacrifices continued to be offered in many parts of the 
empire . . . , and the traditional religious routines of households 
throughout the empire could continue unaffected.71 
Even later Christian emperors, including Theodosius, “continued 
to tolerate or even support paganism in various ways, and to 
appoint substantial numbers of known pagans to high positions 
within the empire.”72  On this view, the emperors engaged not in 
wholehearted suppression, but in “halfhearted coercive and 
somewhat more consistent symbolic support of the new religion.”73 
Nevertheless, paganism lost more than its official backing.  
To ban pagan practices and rituals, while leaving the bans 
underenforced or unenforced, was to render paganism a kind of 
black-market or grey-market religion.  It would be officially 
forbidden but permitted in practice; it would continue under 
sufferance rather than as a matter of right.  Given the continued 
 
70 PHILIP HUGHES, THE CONVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 16 (1957); RAMSAY 
MACMULLEN, CHRISTIANIZING THE ROMAN EMPIRE 55–56, 100–01 (1984). 
71 SMITH, supra note 1, at 168 (quoting EDWARD WATTS, THE FINAL PAGAN 
GENERATION 102 (2015)). 
72 Id. at 173 (footnote omitted). 
73 Id. at 177. 
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existence of many visible pagan symbols, it would be too much to 
say that paganism was relegated to  private spaces alone.  But the 
increasing removal of state support for pagan institutions—
including the continuation of what had initially been private 
bequests—certainly suggests that its public status was being 
squeezed into a smaller and narrower scope.  And in a state in 
which private and public—if those terms had any meaning—were 
intertwined, the removal of public support was, and was seen as, 
significant.74 
Paganism, in Gibbon’s words, “would be deprived of [its] force 
and energy, if [it was] no longer celebrated at the expense, as well 
as in the name, of the republic.”75  Many pagans would accept these 
terms, just as some Christians consented to cast a few grains of 
incense on the altar of the Roman gods during the pagan 
dispensation.  Understandably, however, others would resist, or at 
least worry that the “compromise” would lead to the passing of 
their way of life.76 
In the arguments over the Altar of Victory, we see at least one 
pagan “counteroffer,” a familiar one given contemporary American 
debates over civil religion and governmental religious displays.  In 
his argument that emperor Valentinian II should retain the altar, 
the pagan senator and prefect Symmachus “emphasized that the 
maintenance of the shrine was a way of preserving a continuity of 
identity with Rome’s pagan past.”77  Retaining the altar would be 
less a matter of faith than of custom and tradition.78  In modern 
terms, the pagans proposed that pagan state symbols be retained 
not for their religious value, but as an “acknowledgment” that 
much of Roman history and tradition stemmed from paganism.  It 
is equally familiar and unsurprising that figures such as Ambrose  
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other pagan institutions was seen as important by both Christians and pagans in part 
because “it was the denial of support that was perceived to be public in nature”). 
75 Id. (quoting 2 GIBBON, supra note 33, at 75). 
76 See id. at 176. 
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would reject this counteroffer, refusing to treat the statue as 
lacking in religious significance and insisting that its continued 
presence would “insult the Faith.”79 
Based on the account so far, we can see several central factors 
in the play of offer and counteroffer, acceptance and refusal, and 
toleration and persecution that make up the early struggle 
between the pagan and Christian dispensations and their 
alternating offers of “peaceful coexistence.”  They help fill in the 
central thesis of this portion of Smith’s book: that each side in that 
era’s culture war “held out terms of mutual accommodation that 
seemed fair and reasonable to them, but that for discernible 
reasons were not . . . accepted by the other side.”80  The factors 
identified here are hardly novel or surprising.  They are common 
ingredients in many cultural-political struggles, including our 
own.  Setting them out clearly may nevertheless be useful, both in 
understanding Smith’s book and in setting a foundation on which 
we can expand on or add detail to the argument he presents there. 
The very familiarity of these common features may be 
significant in its own right.  These factors are easily recognized 
when looking at some historical event, but may be less visible 
when applied to our own situation—especially for those who are 
actively engaged in the struggles of our own time.81  Setting out 
these factors with respect to events occurring over several 
centuries and multiple regimes may make those factors more 
perspicuous when applied to current events.  And it may incline 
us to greater charity toward the combatants on both sides, while 
making clearer the extent to which apparently sincere and novel 
arguments and reactions are, from another perspective, rehearsals 
of long-familiar steps in an old dance. 
First, then, taking Smith’s account as a given, the actions 
taken by each regime are not simply coercive, oppressive, or 
persecutory.  Purely arbitrary or bigoted persecution occurs, of 
course, but is better associated with unstable tyrannies than with 
relatively stable and longer-lasting political regimes.  Coercion 
 
79 Id. (quoting AMBROSE, EPISTLE 18 ¶ 31, https://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/ 
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and persecution, or prosecution, are less likely to occur, or to 
command much attention or resources, with respect to minority 
groups that are viewed as inconsequential and unthreatening.  
And before any of those actions take place, a reasonably well-
functioning society that contains a plurality of groups and views is 
likely first to attempt to secure the loyalty and cooperation of that 
group.  In each of the cases we have examined, the first step taken 
by the ruling regime was not hostility or violence but an attempt 
at “peaceful coexistence . . . on fair and mutually acceptable 
terms.”82 
Second, the compromises offered were reasonable and fair 
from the perspective of the ruling dispensation.  Built into its view 
of acceptable compromise was a set of premises about the basic 
values of that society, and what was needed for the preservation 
of those basic values and, by extension, of the society itself.  Again, 
at least for a society that was—from the kind of distance of time 
and space that can momentarily bracket vast areas of internal 
injustice and inequality, such as imperial conquest, the reliance 
on slave labor, and the subordinate status of women, and focus 
instead political and cultural elites—reasonably stable and 
pluralistic, these values were not, or would not have been seen by 
the ruling regime as, inherently unreasonable.  To the contrary, 
they would have been understood as natural, reasonable, and 
essential for society to survive and flourish.  The compromises 
would have been seen as demanding little or nothing that they 
would be unable to do easily: a few grains of incense thrown on the 
altar, “a small gesture of respect,”83 or actions of reciprocity and 
civic community that any decent citizen should have no trouble 
performing. 
Third, the compromises were viewed as unacceptable by the 
side to which they were offered.  Because each side “failed fully to 
grasp and credit the other side’s commitments,” the offeror 
proposed compromises that seemed easily acceptable but proved 
impossible.84  To the side faced with the offer, the fact that the 
dominant regime presented it as reasonable and easy to comply 
with may have encouraged and exacerbated rejection.  The 
compromise might seem, from the perspective of the side faced 
with the offer, unreasonable and unbearable—not a small sacrifice 
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but “a betrayal of the faith.”85  The fact that such an offer was 
presented as reasonable would fuel the suspicion that the offer was 
a “sham,”86 the leading edge of a greater effort to wipe the offerees  
out—a “first experiment on [their] liberties.”87 
Fourth, this pattern of offer and refusal could lead to a cycle 
of suspicion, reaction, hostility, and ultimately coercion or 
persecution.  The rejection of a “reasonable” offer would confirm 
the regime’s view that it faced an “inflexible, dogmatic” group that 
is “undeserving of accommodation.”88  That rejection would seem 
even more bewildering and hostile, and thus deserving of a hostile 
response, if it appeared to go against the offeree’s prior willingness 
to live under those terms, just as many Christians did show a 
willingness to cast their grains of incense on the altar of the 
Roman gods.  It would naturally encourage efforts to take a more 
assertive position with respect to that group: to lay down strict 
rules lest a group of this sort poison the body politic.  And that 
response would, in turn, confirm the suspicion of the other side 
that the initial offer was a sham and the harbinger of greater 
restrictions, reinforcing its decision to refuse and resist. 
This pattern could arise despite and alongside the fifth point: 
at any given time, the “logic of persecution” could be such that the 
persecuting side could be seen, or view itself, as “not gratuitously 
vindictive or malicious” in its actions but sensible and “entirely 
rational.”89  Given the values and goals of a state or a political and 
cultural regime, there are always “limits to what [can] be 
accommodated.”90  Where a group appears to pose a threat to those 
values, not least in what are seen as “troubled times”—and we 
often view the present as troubled—it makes sense to address that 
threat, as one would excise the harmless growth that may indicate 
a tumor.91  No special hostility or bigotry was required and none 
might be perceived, at least by the regulatory actor.  It is, of course, 
easier to accept that point from the distance of centuries than to  
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apply it to one’s own time.  And, as the fourth point suggests, the 
dynamic of offer and refusal, regulation and reaction, could soon 
enough add an extra edge to the responses of both sides. 
This leads to the sixth point: over time, such contests became 
struggles for power rather than efforts to arrive at terms of 
peaceful coexistence.  Such a perspective would seem especially 
natural if individual disputes—over whether a statue would 
remain in place or be removed, for instance—were viewed as one 
piece of a larger, “providential” struggle between good and evil,92 
or as one battle in a larger, inevitable narrative of irreversible 
“progress[ ].”93  Even if a particular compromise is not seen that 
way at first, the seeming obstinacy of the refusal of one side and 
the seeming persecution resulting from that obstinate refusal will 
soon convince each side that there is little room and no more time 
left for “just getting along.”94 
In this way, the ancient culture war became, in a way that 
Smith suggests is true again today, and that may always be true 
of such contests, “a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the 
cultural and political community and the self-conception by which 
the community constitutes and governs itself.”95  The language of 
offer and counteroffer with which Smith describes the efforts at 
peaceful coexistence between pagans and Christians emphasizes 
the hope of coexistence.  But it may obscure the obvious truth that 
it is much better to be in the position of the dominant group 
making the offer than that of the subordinate group faced with 
little choice but to accept or reject it, or at best to beg for the chance 
to make a counteroffer.  As I will suggest below, things may be 
different when both sides are in equipoise and neither is in a 
realistic position to take control.  Any hint of instability will lead 
to a more combative stance. 
Again, we may view this observation critically or 
sympathetically.  “Americans,” Smith writes, “with their historic 
commitment to liberty, are unlikely to sympathize with a party 
that strives for ‘domination.’ ”96  But with enough distance the 
matter may look different.  It is at least understandable that both 
sides should end up fighting for the strategic high ground rather 
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than seeking to share that power or work out some modus vivendi.  
And one may observe sympathetically, as Smith does, that in 
war—cultural or otherwise—“the likely alternative to dominating 
is being dominated.”97  From that perspective, “[w]e may be more 
sympathetic” to those who “are struggling to avoid being 
dominated, culturally and politically.”98 
This power struggle is in large measure a contest over who 
gets to define the baseline values against which a “reasonable” 
offer of compromise is made and against which the side that rejects 
the offer may be seen as undeserving of further accommodation or 
outreach.  We can thus see the seventh point: that cultural and 
political power struggles are “in large measure a struggle to 
control public symbols.”99  It is unsurprising that so much of the 
contest between pagans and Christians involved control over 
symbols such as the Altar of Victory, or that they fought over 
which religion would receive “imperial approval,” even if the other 
faith was still tolerated.100  Each side, struggling to occupy the 
position of the dominant party that offers compromises, sought 
through power over symbols to “create a conception of the city” as 
pagan—or Christian.101 
That so much should be seen as turning on tangible or 
intangible symbols, and that control over these symbols should 
have played out as a part of a larger struggle for political and 
cultural control, suggests an eighth and final point: the 
importance and malleability of the scope of “public” and “private.”  
This point is commonly recognized today.102  But while it is often 
discussed by scholars, at any given moment the public may have a 
more fixed view of what constitutes public or private—and those 
who are intellectually aware of the complexities of these questions 
may ignore or forget them when they engage as advocates in the 
culture wars themselves.  So time and distance, again, may help. 
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The shifting and potentially expanding notion of what 
constituted a “public” matter deserving of the state’s attention and 
regulation is clearly visible in the struggles between Christians 
and pagans in the Roman Empire.  The Altar of Victory was 
unquestionably a “public symbol,” one that served an obvious role 
in the civic structure, and it had been placed there by Augustus.103  
It was also a shrine, next door to and not in the Senate House.104  
But both sides saw it as clearly public in every sense and of 
immense actual and symbolic importance.105  Both sides fought over 
forms of support that were “perceived to be public in nature.”106  
This entailed a fight not just over actual public support, but over 
what constituted “public” support and not private action.  Thus, to 
continue or cut off funding for pagan temples and vestal virgins 
was alternately argued to be the continuation of private bequests, 
or the use of funds that had “long been deemed part of the public 
treasury” and should be treated as coming from the emperor’s 
“own funds.”107 
In other cases, the contestation over what constituted public 
and private concerned arenas, like the marketplace, that could be 
seen as both, or neither.  Commercial transactions had to proceed 
through “authorized markets,” in which market participants were 
required to “give specific divine honours to the Caesars.”108  Nor 
was this the only restriction.  Rather, as Gibbon wrote: 
The innumerable deities and rites of polytheism were closely 
interwoven with every circumstance of business or pleasure, of 
public or of private life; and it seemed impossible to escape the 
observance of them without at the same time renouncing the 
commerce of mankind and all the offices and amusements of 
society.109 
The closer the connection between spaces such as the marketplace 
and the rites and requirements of the dominant regime, the more 
the dissenter in such a space “found himself encompassed with 
infernal snares.”110  Similarly, occupations that we might today see 
as public or private, but in which one’s private views might be seen 
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as irrelevant to the performance of those occupations, ended up 
coming within the vortex of the power struggle, as with Julian’s 
edict barring Christians from serving as teachers, which were not 
public positions but were thought to raise public concerns about 
the fitness of those who occupied them.111 
These factors played out recurrently throughout the stages of 
struggle for social, political, and cultural control between the 
pagans and Christians.  Given the nature of human conflict, it will 
be no surprise that we can see the same thing playing out in our 
own contemporary culture wars. 
II. OFFER, COUNTEROFFER, AND POWER STRUGGLE  
IN RELIGIOUS EXERCISE  
Smith argues that current cultural struggles, particularly 
those centering around the relationship between law and religion, 
represent “a renewal of the fourth-century struggle between 
Christianity and paganism.”112  He acknowledges that the parallel 
he finds is necessarily a simplified picture, an “artificial imposition 
upon a complex and messy reality,”113 and that his use of the 
“pagan” label to describe a set of religious and cultural beliefs is 
intended to be “provocative.”114  It will surely be treated as such, 
and no doubt will produce much useful and thoughtful criticism, 
as well as more questionable praise or scorn for his thesis 
depending on one’s alliances in the culture wars. 
In this Essay, I avoid directly disputing Smith’s language and 
basic diagnosis.  It is an important and seriously offered diagnosis, 
not merely a clever rhetorical framing.  It arguably “provide[s] 
insights that more conventional accounts of our situation do 
not,”115 and helps us see our own moment with a greater sense of 
historical continuity rather than as something wholly new and 
urgent.  This is not simply a clever repackaging of a standard 
account of the culture wars.  In particular, Smith’s attempt to 
understand and describe the values and assumptions of both 
“pagan” and “Christian” worldviews, and his focus on the 
distinction between transcendent and immanent understandings 
of existence, are not simply echoes of a description of left versus 
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right, liberty versus equality, tradition versus progress, or other 
standard dichotomies.  Whether his account is completely correct 
or not—and there is surely much to question about it—it offers a 
valuable new lens, one that does not entail enrolling in one camp 
or the other or map neatly onto standard legal and political 
divisions. 
All that said, his basic description of the modern culture wars 
will be familiar to those who toil in this field.  Many of us have 
attempted to understand the current state of religious liberty 
through the lens of the culture wars.116  Smith’s modern parallel 
to Pliny the Younger, the legal scholar Douglas Laycock, has 
worried over these questions for some time.117  Readers familiar 
with this literature will not be startled by the suggestion that “[t]he 
contemporary fight over religious freedom is one battleground—a 
central one, as it happens—in the larger and essentially religious 
struggle to define and constitute America.”118  
In this Part, I do not summarize all of Smith’s arguments or 
relitigate individual cases and controversies in law and religion.  
My goal instead is to draw on the factors identified in Part I and 
see what additional details or insights they might add to this now-
common way of understanding modern disputes—legal, scholarly, 
and discursive—concerning religious liberty. 
Smith’s fundamental point is that the culture war “was and 
is a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural and 
political community and the self-conception by which the 
community constitutes and governs itself.”119  One “theater[ ]” in that 
struggle involves the relationship between law, religion, and the 
Constitution.120  It includes struggles over religious displays and 
other “expressions of public religiosity.”121  But it also includes 
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disputes over the accommodation of religion, an area in which we 
see both increased controversy over particular claims to religious 
accommodation and “rising opposition to religious accommodation” 
itself.122 
Much of this struggle centers around sex.123  Although one of 
the leading controversial cases, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.,124 concerned women’s access to contraceptive care, no single 
issue stands alone.  The struggles accompanying Hobby Lobby, 
and the argument about religious accommodation that surrounded 
that case, were tied to the broader issue of gay rights and same-
sex marriage.125  Contestation over those issues, combined with the 
constitutional recognition of same-sex marriage rights,126 has in 
turn led to struggles over religious accommodation.  This conflict 
has most prominently manifested over the question of whether 
businesses that provide allegedly artistic and personalized 
services will be obliged to provide them for same-sex weddings and 
similar celebrations.127  These have all been live issues for some 
time,128 and before them came fights over contraception and 
abortion.  All of them are connected, not discrete, areas of cultural, 
political, and legal contestation.129 
That both sides see these as connected matters suggests that 
this is not simply a matter of individual cases or issues.  Rather, 
what is at stake is a clash of worldviews.  Each individual dispute 
is part of a larger war, one in which “fundamental human rights” 
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2016) (discerning “the same fundamental and reciprocal structure” of dispute in 
“sexual issues” such as “abortion, same-sex marriage, contraception, emergency 
contraception, sterilization, [and] in vitro fertilization”) [hereinafter, CORPORATE 
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are opposed to a connected set of “grave evils.”130  To win any one 
battle is insufficient.  Although each side may with complete 
sincerity view the stakes of any particular issue as high, much of 
the fervor comes from the belief that the issue does not stand alone 
and that defeat on one issue would portend disaster across a range 
of others.131  Thus, the degree of fervor with which each issue is 
debated often seems to outstrip the facts or immediate implications 
of the dispute.132 
All this is consistent with Smith’s basic thesis.  As in the early 
contests between the pagans and Christians, modern struggles 
over law and religion, at least on cases with a salient culture-war 
element, are at bottom a struggle for power involving a clash of 
“competing sanctities.”133  As G.K. Chesterton put it, we face “a fight 
of creeds masquerading as [a debate over] policies.”134 
Through the pagan-Christian lens, Smith offers a novel 
account of the contest over religious accommodation.  Religious 
accommodation is “an approach with a discernibly Christian 
character.”135  This is true not just in a “genealogical” sense related 
to the Christian roots of Western or American history.136  It is true 
in a deeper “logical or structural” sense.137  “Christian” here means 
not Christian belief or history alone but a particular conception of 
religion as transcendent.  Religious accommodation is thus seen as 
support for the “recognition of a transcendent authority” separate 
from, and at least equal to, any claims of authority made by the 
“secular” state.138 
Rendered in individualist terms in light of American religious 
and political history, this transcendental vision of religious 
accommodation translates to a view that “within wide bounds,” 
individuals must be free “to judge what the transcendent truth and 
 
130 Id. at 254. 
131 See, e.g., Perry Dane, Doctrine and Deep Structure in the Contraception 
Mandate Debate 2, 7 (SSRN Working Paper, Aug. 5, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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132 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 316–18. 
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its corollary obligations might be,” and the state must “refrain 
from interfering with—or, put positively, [must] accommodate—
matters within that jurisdiction over which the state ha[s] no 
authority, or no ‘cognizance.’ ”139  The locus classicus of this view 
in the American canon is Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance.  
There, Madison argues that each person owes a duty to “the 
Creator” that “is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of 
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”140  Accordingly, where 
religion is concerned, “no mans [sic] right is abridged by the 
institution of Civil Society and . . . Religion is wholly exempt from 
its cognizance.”141 
By contrast, the modern “pagan” view, which supports a view 
of the sacred as immanent in the world rather than transcendental, 
rejects the view of “two cities,” heavenly and earthly, in favor of 
“the city,” the “fully and exclusively sovereign city.”142  It is thus 
“unwilling as a public matter to recognize or defer to any higher or 
supposedly transcendent authority.”143  The “pagan” may well 
support religious accommodation.  But she will do so “not out of 
deference to a higher authority, but out of solicitude”—as a matter 
of respect not for the individual’s divine obligation, but for her 
conscience.144  Even this view, which remained fairly strong until 
recent years, is increasingly fragile today. 
One need not fully agree with this account, even if one takes 
as a given both Smith’s pagan-Christian framework and the 
assertion that it is being played out again in a modern context.  
Although I find Smith’s general framework intriguing, I am not 
sure I find this specific account completely convincing.  I am not 
sure that a belief in a specific transcendent authority necessarily 
translates into legal and political respect for “transcendent 
religiosity” in general,145 or that Smith’s description of 
accommodation as a belief that “government should respect 
people’s religious commitments”146 requires much by way of 
allegiance to either a transcendent or an immanent understanding 
 
139 Id. at 314. 
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of the world.147  Nor am I certain that a “pagan” belief in immanent 
religiosity leads inexorably to hostility to accommodation, or that 
all modern opposition to religious accommodation is based on a 
rejection of the transcendent or an acceptance of immanent 
religiosity.  My own strong support for religious accommodation is 
closer to what Smith describes as a position of religious and “civic 
agnosticism,” under which the fact that religious claimants “might be 
right” in claiming an overriding duty to a creator deserves to be taken 
seriously.148  That argument for accommodation is particularly 
strong if one also holds a legal pluralist view that the state is only 
one form of authority, one form of constitutive institution, and that 
its reach should not be endless and effectively extinguish 
competing authorities.149 
For present purposes, however, while noting my reservations, 
I do not attempt to show Smith is wrong, let alone that I am right.  
Rather, my focus here is on the struggle for power in the area of 
religious exercise, and the relevance of the factors noted in Part I 
in enriching our understanding of that struggle. 
The starting point here is the basic thesis that each 
dispensation does not simply seek immediate victory.  Rather, the 
relationship between the contending sides is a play of proposed 
compromises, each reasonable from its own perspective but failing 
“fully to grasp and credit the other side’s commitments,”150 and 
their concomitant rejection, leading to the cycle of reaction and 
counter-reaction that is precisely what makes culture wars so 
intractable. 
 
 
147 I also have some doubts about whether a Christian understanding of religious 
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Taking as a given Smith’s account of religious accommodation 
as a “Christian” position, if not all its details, the demand for 
accommodation seems eminently reasonable, a request for small 
sacrifices.  It follows a simple principle: 
[G]overnment should affirmatively try to leave space for people 
to live in accordance with their diverse understandings of the 
sacred.  So if a particular law would require a person or group to 
violate a sincerely held religious commitment, then a just and 
humane government will, if reasonably possible (because 
sometimes it will not be reasonably possible), find ways to excuse 
compliance by those people whose religion would be burdened.151 
This does not seem much to ask.  Indeed, it is reasonable by 
definition.  It allows for accommodation but acknowledges others’ 
rights and interests.  Depending on its terms, a state religious 
accommodation statute may expand the rights of potential 
claimants but will not license absolutely anything.152  A legislative 
accommodation excusing a closely held company from direct 
compliance with the contraceptive mandate may be statutorily and 
constitutionally permissible but it will take place in the context of 
“an existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented 
[government] framework to provide coverage” to female employees 
of that company seeking contraceptive coverage.153  Rights of 
refusal to provide personalized services for same-sex weddings will 
be available, as they may in other cases where the vendor of such 
services strongly objects to endorsing a particular message or 
view, but, ex hypothesi, “the services offered by these professionals 
[will be] readily available from other providers, and . . . no sensible 
same-sex couple would actually want the services of a provider 
who is religiously opposed to their union.”154  Even if one takes 
seriously and respectfully the claim that accommodation in each of 
these cases works a dignitary or even some tangible harm, it is 
possible to understand that from the perspective of the 
pro-accommodation side, these requests may be thought of as 
reasonable, limited in scope, and requiring only small sacrifices 
from the other side.  That may be especially true in light of the  
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stakes as perceived by that side: the need to obey “a higher law or 
obligation—something like the law of God—that is independent 
both of government and of [the claimant’s] own preferences.”155 
One can say exactly the same thing about the offered 
compromise from the perspective of the “pagan” dispensation.  From 
that perspective, there is no doubt that invidious discrimination 
against religion is unconstitutional and wrong.  In that sense, the 
legal default is respect for religion, transcendent or otherwise, not 
opposition to it.156  And many religious accommodation claims 
will—at least for many “pagans” or modern constitutionalists—be 
respected as a matter of conscience, as a matter of equal treatment 
for people of different creeds, cultures, and so on, or as a 
reasonable legislative effort to respect pluralism and diversity.  All 
that will be asked of the religious claimant is to respect and obey 
the law like any other citizen, after all the considerations of a 
“tolerant and humane community” have been taken into account.157  
The religious citizen will be asked not to discriminate against 
others on the basis of certain protected categories and not to 
disobey laws—public accommodations laws, nondiscrimination 
laws, laws ensuring the provision of basic contraceptive services—
that embody fundamental national commitments.  Those laws will 
still leave ample room for nonparticipation, in an individual or 
“private” capacity, with views and individuals one considers 
objectionable.  The wedding cake vendor will be required to sell 
cakes to same-sex couples but not to open a wedding cake store in 
the first place or attend same-sex weddings on her own time.   
In that light, any sacrifices demanded of the religious objector 
again seem small.  As with the accommodationist or “Christian” 
compromise, the sacrifices involved will be even more reasonable 
in light of the stakes: the constitutional and moral values of 
equality and dignity, especially for disadvantaged or vulnerable 
groups that have long been treated unequally by law and society. 
From the perspective of the group being offered the 
compromise, the reaction will be very different.  Take the offer made 
by the “pagan” dispensation.  From the perspective of a secular 
thinker, the legal regime merits obedience as the product of public 
reason and democratic deliberation.  No other model is “credible 
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for anyone of a critical and informed disposition.”158  While the 
state ought to “respect and promote” religion and religious liberty, 
any claimed religious authority is still “subordinate to the 
authority of the state.”159  Thus, the rejection of religious 
accommodation—when, in a given case, it is ultimately rejected—
should be the end of the matter.  From the perspective of a 
religious integralist, for whom religion imbricates every action and 
the state is the newcomer, with an imperfect and ultimately 
secondary claim to authority, we can expect a very different 
response. 
Conversely, from the “pagan” perspective, the “Christian” 
offer of a regime of religious accommodation can easily be viewed 
as involving a claim of the right to become “a law unto himself,”160 
regardless of the sincerity of the assertion that one is obeying a 
duty imposed from on high and not simply serving one’s own 
desires.  In both cases, not only will the premise that the sacrifice 
involved is small be hard to understand or accept; the stakes 
involved for each will make it even harder to accept the terms that 
have been offered. 
This is one part of the story.  Just as important is the point 
emphasized throughout Smith’s book: that what is at issue is not 
simply a set of offered and rejected compromises but a struggle for 
dominance.  Each side seeks to be the regime making the offer 
rather than the group faced with the hard and not entirely 
voluntary choice of taking it, or of rejecting it and facing the threat 
of punishment or lawless status.  Although the contest involves 
elections and judicial nominations rather than regicide or 
revolution, Twitter rather than torture,161 its existence is no less 
plain. 
This is one way to understand two closely related but 
seemingly conflicting facts.  On the one hand, it is widely agreed 
that the rhetorical pitch and volume of contemporary rhetoric over 
law, religion, and politics in the culture-war arena have become 
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nasty, polarized, ill-tempered, and accusatory.  Both sides are 
routinely accused of intolerance.162  The language of bigotry is 
regularly invoked to marginalize the other side as irrationally and 
invidiously refusing the offered compromise.163  Arguments on both 
sides are pursued with “evangelical zeal” and seemingly little 
regard for “sober appeal[s] to facts.”164  This does not describe 
everyone in our society,165 but it is characteristic of many of the 
loudest and most active voices in the debate.  Those voices in turn 
may “make it harder than it once was to remain neutral or 
undecided.”166  Those who take such a position may constitute a 
large if diffuse percentage of the population, but they are 
marginalized in public debate, represented by no interest group or 
political party. 
On the other hand, the fierceness of the debate and the 
heightened nature of the rhetoric can obscure the fact that both 
sides agree on a great many things.  As Smith notes, “Virtually 
everyone at least purports to be in favor of religious freedom.”167  
Although the meaning of that term may be contested and an 
increasing number of voices may question it altogether, it is still 
true that in many cases, agreement is widespread and sincere.  
Conversely, virtually every advocate of religious accommodation 
agrees that the kinds of things that critics of accommodation worry 
about—especially racial discrimination—fall outside the realm of 
“reasonable” accommodation168 and should be opposed.  Thus, 
many scholars who criticize religious accommodation joined the 
broad coalitions that came together to support the religious 
claimant in the prisoner case Holt v. Hobbs.169  And many of those 
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who support religious accommodation make a point of 
emphasizing that they support racial antidiscrimination law, and 
take great pains to distinguish it from modern cases involving 
accommodation in other areas.170  Finally, and despite growing 
disagreements about religious accommodation, both those who 
unapologetically favor it and those who are dubious but 
acknowledge that there are cases where it is appropriate agree 
that there are limits to what can be accommodated.171 
Increasingly, that position is categorized as falling on the 
“pagan” side and described in terms of harm to third parties, 
including dignitary harms.172  But accommodationists, too, insist 
that there are cases in which it is not “reasonably possible . . . to 
excuse compliance [with generally applicable laws] by those people 
whose religion would be burdened.”173  Those limits may not be put 
expressly in terms of harm to third parties or dignitary harms.  
But the practical limits agreed upon by accommodationists can 
often be understood in those terms.174  And on the other side of the 
ledger, there are cases in which both sides differ as to the reasons 
but agree that the state should accommodate the religious 
objector.  Although the Vietnam draft exemption cases175 can 
rightly be understood as marking a “subtle transition” in the views 
of the “pagan” party, in which conscience becomes equal or 
superior to religion as a ground for accommodation,176 they can 
also be read as indicating an area of continuity in which most 
people on both sides support—albeit for different reasons—the 
long-standing tradition of exempting peaceful and sincere 
religious groups like the Quakers from certain generally 
applicable obligations.177 
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What to make of this curious combination: a wide area of 
agreement, and an increasingly shrill focus on areas of 
disagreement, with each side accusing the other of being 
intolerant and unreasonable despite the fact that both sides seem 
able to agree on at least some basic rules and limits?  It can 
perhaps best be understood as lending support to the basic thesis 
that what is occurring is not simply a struggle over outcomes or 
even ideas but rather is fundamentally a struggle for control, a 
“larger and essentially religious struggle to define and constitute 
America.”178  As with the original pagan-Christian conflict, it can 
be understood not as a rejection of the very idea of compromise but 
as a power struggle over who will occupy the high ground and thus 
set the terms of the compromise: to determine who gets to make 
the offer and who must take it.  On this view, it is beside the point 
that there may be areas of practical agreement despite 
fundamental differences of worldview.  What matters is who gets 
to shape the offer, to judge whether the other side has complied 
with it or conversely is subject to the “logic of persecution,” and to 
determine the boundaries and bases of what constitutes an 
“unreasonable” accommodation of religion.  Neither side may be 
hostile either to religion or to values such as equality and 
dignity.179  But both understand that it makes all the difference 
who gets to define those terms and their application.  It matters 
who gets to define the values that constitute the American “city” 
itself. 
From this perspective, it follows that we will see a rejection of 
what, from the perspective of each side, seems like reasonable 
compromises and small sacrifices: the modern equivalents of “a 
few grains of incense.”  This perspective, rather than reinforcing 
the view that one or both sides are being harsh and unreasonable, 
may encourage a greater degree of understanding and sympathy 
for each side and (up to a point, anyway) for the heated nature of 
its rhetoric.  Each side’s rejection of the other will stem not from 
sheer malice but from the failure “fully to grasp and credit the 
other side’s commitments.”180  
As we saw earlier, however, a compromise offer is not a single-
shot game.  It is a dynamic process, involving a series of moves 
and reactions that ultimately nudge each side toward the logic of 
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persecution.  Each side understands that behind an offer of 
compromise—often, for both sides, a compromise that involves 
some degree of religious accommodation but within certain 
limits—stands a larger worldview.  Each side seeks to name and 
to control the values of the larger society—or the “city,” as Smith 
calls it, with a backward glance to Rome and to Augustine’s 
account of the earthly and heavenly cities. 
As the renewed coalition of groups in cases like Holt v. Hobbs 
or the hoasca case181 suggests, there may be cases in which both 
sides are willing to work together despite their larger 
disagreements, at least as long as their opposing worldviews are 
obscured by the technical language of legal doctrine.  But when the 
disputes approach the heart of those differing worldviews and the 
values they hold dear—often centering around sexuality and thus 
making perspicuous different views about morality, the nature of 
personhood, and the position of the state on these matters—
coexistence takes a back seat to conflict. 
Even where the proffered compromise is acceptable, each side 
will suspect, with good reason, that the larger goal is the 
ascendancy of a comprehensive worldview—“Christian” or 
“pagan,” in Smith’s terms, or “transcendent” or “immanent,” but 
more commonly described with terms like “secular” or “religious,” 
“conservative” or “progressive”—that, once it has the commanding 
heights, will not stop there.  So it may reject even an acceptable 
compromise.  That rejection will be viewed as unreasonable.  The 
conclusion that it is unreasonable will lead to the conclusion that 
the refusal can only be understood as a product of bigotry or 
hostility.  Thus, Martin Castro, chairman of the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights, asserted that “[t]he phrases ‘religious 
liberty’ and ‘religious freedom,’ ” which we can here understand to 
stand in for the accommodationist position, “will stand for nothing 
except hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for discrimination, 
intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, Christian 
supremacy or any form of intolerance.”182  And the other side will 
see not a reasonable set of limitations on religious exercise, but an 
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outright “war on religion.”183  These kinds of reactions will beget 
counter-reactions and escalations in rhetoric and action.  And so 
the cycle goes. 
It is easy to understand why each side may reject the 
compromise offered by the other side, especially as long as an 
implicit premise is that one side has the power to make or 
withdraw the offer and to set the terms of what is reasonable or 
not.  Once that happens, it is equally easy to understand why the 
two sides will move farther apart and be increasingly likely to 
attribute bad faith and “unshakeable obstinacy”184 to each other.  
If each side embodies a significantly different worldview in which 
different values are defined or prioritized differently, and in which 
the very question of whether we live in “one city” or two is at issue, 
it is understandable that each side will perceive the other as 
wanting a “total win,”185 and that each side will be incentivized to 
seek a total win. 
One last and increasingly important factor is worth noting.  It 
may be seen as following naturally from the logic of each side’s 
worldview and values, or as a strategic part of the power struggle.  
Indeed, given that even strategic choices can be sincere and that 
even calculated moves by individual strategists may quickly be 
absorbed into the sincerely held worldview of a larger group, it will 
often be both. 
This is the struggle, one that we saw in the historical 
Christian-pagan contest, to define the scope of what is “public” or 
“private” and thus subject to greater or lesser forms of regulation.  
It is a contest over the boundaries of the walls of the “city.”186  As 
we saw in Part I, historically much of this debate involved the 
rituals or “small sacrifices” that could be imposed as a condition  
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for entry into the marketplace and other common spaces, around 
the fitness of pagans or Christians for particular offices, and 
around public symbols. 
Today, this battle often involves the expansion of the 
“public sphere” through public accommodations laws.  As Smith 
acknowledges, both accommodationists and their opponents have 
often understood certain spaces, such as the marketplace, “to have 
both public and private dimensions.”187  As I noted above, 
accommodationists have long argued, both on sincere grounds and 
as a matter of demonstrating the reasonableness of their own 
proferred compromise, that racial discrimination should be 
understood as a public concern subject to regulation.  As other 
issues, such as same-sex marriage, have moved to the forefront, the 
logic that supported public accommodations laws prohibiting 
racial discrimination has extended to issues in which more 
members of the “Christian” party, as Smith defines it, will find 
themselves in conflict with the law.  Those whose “religious views 
conflict with” these expanded “public policies” will thus face new 
restrictions on their ability to act consistently with those views in 
“the domain of business, or economic activity.”188 
The current primary example is the set of cases involving 
services for same-sex wedding ceremonies, such as wedding cakes 
or photography.  With a little imagination, one can have sympathy 
for each side’s perspective.  From the “Christian” or transcendent 
religious perspective, the choices involved are “private” in 
important senses and were treated as such until recently.  They 
involve new issues not previously faced by these vendors, who did 
not set up in the marketplace with any particular intention of 
refusing services as such, and thus naturally give rise to new 
dilemmas and sometimes new refusals to provide services.  They 
often involve services that are readily available from other 
vendors, who are eager to provide them for both commercial and 
conscience-driven reasons.  Even if the business owner attempts 
to “be delicate and respectful in expressing [her] religious 
reservations”189 and offers to provide every possible service except  
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the one that most centrally implicates her religious beliefs,190 she 
may find herself either forced into compliance despite her religious 
views or squeezed out of business. 
From the “pagan” or “immanent” perspective, one can 
understand why the idea that the business owner’s choice is 
wholly private seems absurd.  On this view, the marketplace has 
long been understood as having “both public and private 
dimensions,” and we have long insisted that it comply with basic 
values of nondiscrimination.  Those values have been logically and 
democratically expanded to include new categories.  A business 
owner who balks at this will be viewed as suddenly rejecting a law 
she has long been required, and willing, to follow.  The conclusion 
that such refusals cause serious harms to dignity and equality—
harms that outweigh the relatively trivial desire not to provide the 
same services that the business owner has offered to countless 
others—will be logically “understandable” and “plausible.”191 
Given the reasonableness of each of these competing 
perspectives, it is understandable that both sides have fought over 
the definition of public and private, through both the expansion of 
public accommodation statutes and the passage of religious 
freedom legislation that provides carve-outs in some of these new 
areas.  It makes sense that each side, viewing the other as engaged 
in an imperial move to define the line between public and private 
and thus the boundaries of the “city,” will be unyielding in its 
opposition to the other. 
All of this resembles the struggle Smith describes as having 
taken place over the marketplace and other common spaces in 
ancient Rome.  There, too, public customs, values, and laws 
“permeated Roman imperial society,” making it impossible to 
separate the values and rites of the ruling regime “from 
entertainment, from commerce, from governance, . . . and so on.”192  
Then as now, the argument that the religious objector could 
simply choose not to run a business might seem unconvincing, 
particularly as the scope of what constituted an “authorized 
market,” subject to rules informed by the values of the regnant 
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regime, expanded.193  From our vantage point, we can understand 
why rules of conduct in the marketplace that seemed minor to the 
pagan dispensation would feel to Christians like a set of “infernal 
snares.”194 
Similarly, we saw earlier that one of the most “controversial 
measure[s]” advanced by Julian was his insistence that Christian 
teachers be banned from teaching because their lack of belief in 
the gods made them “morally unfit to teach the classics.”195  Such 
an edict would be perfectly logical from the pagan perspective.  
How could someone do a proper job as a teacher if she rejected the 
values required for the proper education of the city’s youth?  The 
restriction could also be viewed as reasonable because Christians 
could still do plenty of other jobs. 
We could easily imagine a “milder” version of this rule.  Julian 
could have allowed Christians to teach the classics—provided that 
they taught the classical texts, and expressed the values and 
beliefs voiced by those texts, in the same way that a pagan teacher 
who shared those values would.  Doubtless, just as some 
Christians were willing to cast “a few grains of incense” on the 
altar in order to participate in Roman life, some Christians would 
have accepted this bargain.  But it is equally obvious that for 
many, this would be an unacceptable compromise and little 
different from the harsher edict promulgated by Julian. 
The modern equivalent can be found in an increasingly active 
area of contestation: that involving occupational training and 
licensing.  Of course Christians, or members of any other faith, 
transcendent or otherwise, are not prohibited from teaching or 
other jobs because they are Christian.  But as the codes and 
practices of many professions, either directly or through state 
regulation, take on more explicitly the values of the ruling regime, 
new conflicts arise under which it may be difficult both to live and 
act in a way that is consistent with certain religious beliefs and to 
continue practicing as a doctor, a pharmacist, a lawyer, or, to bring 
us full circle, a teacher.196 
In sum, even if one has doubts about Smith’s characterization 
of the modern “pagan” and “Christian” perspectives on religious 
exercise, his broad point seems apt.  These are not simply disputes 
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about individual cases or topics.  Nor, despite areas in which both 
sides support religious accommodation and despite the general 
absence of outright hostility to religion, can these disputes be 
resolved by appeals to “reason” or compromise.  Each side at least 
starts with a willingness to compromise.  But the nature of the 
compromise offered by each, and the underlying values and 
assumptions that ground it, are different in each case. 
As highly salient culture-war issues arise, it is the differences 
and not the common ground that will draw attention.  The cycle of 
rejection, reaction, and accusation that follows from these 
differences will encourage both sides to reject the idea of 
compromise, unless and until they are in a position to set its terms.  
Given their fears that the other side disrespects their way of life 
or fundamental beliefs, they will find coexistence plausible and 
attractive only once they believe their existence itself is not under 
threat.  That will require them to occupy the seat of power: to 
“control . . . the cultural and political community and the self-
conception by which the community constitutes and governs 
itself,”197 and thus the values and terms under which any “peaceful 
coexistence” takes place.  This fight for control of the city will 
inevitably involve a struggle to define the very boundaries of that 
city: what constitutes the “private” space in which people are free 
to believe and act as they please, and what is “public” and subject 
to the public values and rules of the dominant regime. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that free exercise and the 
accommodation of religion have become increasingly hotly 
contested issues, and that these issues can be understood not as 
discrete disputed issues but as a larger power struggle that closely 
resembles, even if it is not identical to, the historical contest 
between pagans and Christians. 
Smith argues that struggles over free exercise and religious 
accommodation can be understood not just in terms of practical 
effects but also as a symbolic war in which accommodation is “a 
constitutive symbol” that represents a vision of the kind of 
transcendently religious community that “America is.”198  Of course, 
one can just as readily understand arguments against 
accommodation in symbolic terms, as a statement about the 
fundamental values that characterize the American community  
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and its laws.  It is not surprising, then, that another battleground, 
both in the ancient past and today, is over religious and other 
symbols themselves.  I turn to that issue next. 
III. STRUGGLES TO DEFINE THE COMMUNITY:  
NON-ESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS 
It is a commonplace observation that much of the action in 
Establishment Clause litigation over the past several decades has 
shifted from questions of funding to questions of public symbols.199  
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on neutrality and equal access to 
funding, developed over a series of cases and subject to certain 
lingering caveats, seems to have attained a level of stability on 
the Court and to have lessened some of the heat in funding 
controversies.200  Unlike the state of affairs during the Founding 
Era, “the prevailing judicial and scholarly consensus seems to 
be that government-sponsored religious messages are more 
problematic than government funding of religion and, more 
broadly, that expressive harms are the chief harms with which the 
Establishment Clause should be concerned.”201 
Doctrinal stability is unlikely to hold where it is at odds with 
social conditions and the state of public argument.  Thus, it is 
unlikely that the relative clarity of these cases is the cause of this 
consensus.  More likely, it reflects underlying differences between 
conditions during the height of debate over funding in the past 
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century and conditions today, such as the decline of open combat 
between Protestants and Catholics.202  Whatever the reason, there 
is more controversy over government religious symbols than over 
government funding of religion. 
We might think of struggles over religious symbols in terms of 
competing dispensations, and the compromises offered by each 
side and accepted or refused by the other.  If modern debates, like 
the ancient one, constitute a struggle for “control of the cultural 
and political community and the self-conception by which the 
community constitutes and governs itself,”203 we can expect that 
struggle to play out in the area of religious symbols just as it has 
with religious accommodation.  Indeed, such a struggle seems not 
only possible but likely.  “[I]n the struggle to define America, 
symbols and discourse are crucial.”204  Thus, each side—Christian 
and pagan, religious and secular, liberal and conservative, or 
however one wishes to frame the divide—will “struggle[ ] to 
monopolize the symbols of legitimacy” in our society.205 
Smith examines “three partly overlapping theaters of that 
struggle” for “mastery within the city”: “symbols or expressions of 
public religiosity, public recognition and ratification of the norms 
of sexuality, and the Constitution itself.”206  In this Part, I focus 
primarily on public religious symbols, and briefly on disputes over 
the meaning of “the Constitution itself.”  I again work from within 
Smith’s framework.  I find it useful for understanding the current 
state of debate but also raise questions about his precise treatment 
of these issues.  More so than in the last part, I find much to 
question here.  Even if one accepts Smith’s acknowledgment that 
his interpretation is necessarily “an artificial imposition upon a 
complex and messy reality,” there are reasons to worry that the 
reality is too messy to bear the interpretation he imposes on it.207  
Before raising those questions, however, it would be helpful first 
to set out Smith’s interpretation. 
For Smith, the culture wars form the context in which these 
struggles play out in the modern era.  They arose after a period of 
relative common ground on religion and its relation to the 
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prevailing culture: a period stretching from the Founding Era to 
the mid-to-late twentieth century, in which there was a “prevalent 
public philosophy or national self-understanding” that our nation 
and its symbols were “pervasively if sometimes amorphously 
Christian in . . . culture and substance.”208  This understanding 
was the basis of what Robert Bellah calls the “American civil 
religion.”209  The “guiding narrative” provided by the American 
civil religion drew heavily on the Bible, starting with the 
Protestant understanding of Scripture and expanding over time 
to include Catholic and Jewish visions as well.210  All these 
understandings were grounded in “a transcendent religiosity.”211 
In that sense, notwithstanding the increasing move away 
from sectarianism and toward “an increasingly inclusive civil 
religion,” this dispensation was “Christian” in the broad sense in 
which Smith uses it in this book.212  Like other dispensations we 
have seen, it did not seek to eliminate whatever a “pagan” or 
“immanent” religiosity would include by way of symbols and public 
rituals and displays.  But the idea that “[w]e are a religious people 
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being”213 was still the 
starting point.  Any tolerance for or positive inclusion of immanent 
or pagan symbols was based on the implicit requirement that the 
minority accept the dominant transcendent vision, or at least 
accept its manifestation in public statements, displays, and 
rituals. 
The “dissolution of this guiding narrative” led to a state of 
division between “two broad and contending camps.”214  One 
“maintained continuity with the old, biblically oriented civil 
religion, while the [other] challenged it.”215  The struggle between 
them “for control of the cultural and political community” is what 
we now describe as the modern culture wars.216  Given that this is 
a contest to establish which understanding will constitute “the 
character of [our] community,” it is unsurprising that “the culture 
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wars have been in large measure a struggle to control public 
symbols.”217  We have not come far from the contest over symbols, 
such as the dispute over the Altar of Victory, that formed a major 
part of the war for mastery over the Roman city. 
Typically, this dispute is treated as a contest between 
“supporters of ‘religious’ symbols and expressions” and “proponents 
of a ‘secular’ public square.”218  Smith offers a different take.  That 
take rests on his excavation of the “Christian” and “pagan” 
dispensations, broadly understood, and his effort to show that they 
continue in existence under the “religious” and “secular” labels.  
The continued relevance of the ancient dispute between 
dispensations becomes apparent once we take into account “the 
ambiguous or equivocal character of the term ‘secular’ ” and the 
“transcendent” and “immanent conceptions of ‘religion.’ ”219 
If the traditional or “Christian” understanding of our 
community is one of transcendent authority, the competing  “pagan” 
understanding emphasizes immanent or “inner-worldly sources of 
moral authority.”220  On this view, rather than a stark contrast 
between “religious” and “secular” views of the public square, we 
actually have a contest between a position favoring “Christian” or 
transcendent public religious displays and messages, and a “pagan” 
or immanent view.  We should understand the modern pagan camp 
as holding two positions.  The first is one of increasing resistance 
to “transcendent public religious symbols.”221  The second position 
is not one of opposition to government symbols and government 
expression as such.  Any community will inevitably want its 
government to say something about “who we are, or what kind of 
community we live in.”222  Rather, it is one that permits only those 
government symbols that are consistent with an immanent or 
pagan understanding of religiosity. 
Here, Smith does two useful and important things.  The first 
influences the second and leads to something of a change of 
position from earlier work.  First, he examines and rejects the 
argument that we have paid too much attention to the dispute over 
symbols.223  That argument suggests that the heat of the dispute 
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is disproportionate to its actual importance—they are just 
symbols, after all—and that our time, attention, and resources 
might “be better spent on matters that actually affect people in 
coercive or material ways.”224   
Of course, one answer is that we just do care about public 
symbols and messages.  But there is good reason to do so.  We live 
in a constructed social and political community, in which much of 
the construction work is done by symbols—not least public 
symbols, which are “expressive and constitutive not just of 
particular private speakers or groups, but of the community.”225  
Disputes over these questions are existential, not trivial.226  To 
borrow the title of a recent book, fights about what our public 
symbols and expressions will include or exclude are ultimately “a 
war for the soul of America.”227 
This leads Smith to a second conclusion.  In this book, he takes 
a much more sympathetic position on a major area of contestation 
in Establishment Clause law: the meaning and value of the 
so-called “endorsement test,” which asks whether a government 
message involving religion treats some Americans as “outsiders” 
or “not full members of the political community.”228  In previous 
work, Smith has criticized that test as “doctrinally deficient and 
without theoretical justification.”229  He has argued that a 
pluralistic culture cannot possibly ensure that everyone feels like 
an insider, and that because the inevitability of alienation from at 
least some government actions or messages “is inherent in a 
pluralistic culture, the aspiration to abolish that phenomenon, or 
to develop a conception of ‘political standing’ that includes a right 
not to feel like an ‘outsider,’ constitutes a utopian vision rather 
than a realistic basis for formulating constitutional doctrine.”230  
Indeed, because the full version of the endorsement test casts 
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doubt on the very reasonableness of the loser in a religious symbol 
case, that test, which “[sets] out to avoid alienation and offense to 
real human beings, . . . ends up adding insult to injury.”231 
Here, however, Smith’s acknowledgment of the constitutive 
importance of symbols, and thus the legitimate nature of the 
struggle for control over those symbols, leads him to a more 
sympathetic treatment of the “no endorsement” idea.  If American 
civil religion is a vital part of who we are, then debates over 
religious displays by government are about more than the kinds of 
“potentially divisive political issues” that arise every time 
government takes a position, and thus create winners or losers, 
with a normal but not constitutionally significant sense of 
alienation.232  In a statement that surely is meant to include 
himself, Smith concludes, “[I]n this sense, as Justice O’Connor 
perceived but her critics sometimes did not, [public] religious 
expressions may have a more fundamental alienating effect than 
other sorts of controversial public statements typically have.”233 
Armed with this sympathy for the seriousness of the claims on 
both sides of the fight over religious symbols, Smith offers a thesis 
about the precise nature of that dispute and its treatment by the 
courts.  Building on his definitions of “secular” and “religious” and 
his distinction between transcendent and immanent religion, 
Smith suggests that “the current struggle over public symbols 
turns out to be more complicated than it initially appears.  In 
prohibiting endorsements of ‘religion,’ the ‘no endorsement’ 
doctrine might mean that government is forbidden to endorse 
traditional or transcendent religion.  Conversely, ‘secular’ 
expressions of more immanent religiosity might be permissible.”234 
According to this thesis, “conventionally ‘religious’ public 
symbols and expressions,” such as “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, might be forbidden.235  But a host of other public 
symbols and expressions would remain: a religiously denuded 
version of the Pledge, the American flag, the national anthem, and 
so on.236  These symbols are not merely “secular.”  They “still 
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seek . . . to stir citizens’ feelings of reverence and devotion” and 
serve “a sacralizing or consecrating function.”237  The Court shows 
no signs of objection to this sort of “this-worldly sacralization.”238  
Traces of sacralization appear in various decisions, such as Justice 
Brennan’s statement in Texas v. Johnson that the flag is “virtually 
sacred to our nation as a whole.”239  In short, the Court has 
“embraced, wittingly or unwittingly, a conception of the political 
community formed in immanently religious terms.”240  Where the 
Court does permit religious symbols or language, it is most likely 
to do so when those expressions “are at least susceptible of being 
interpreted in more immanent or this-worldly terms.”241  The 
result “is to remove the transcendent or Christian stratum of 
American civil religion, thereby leaving the immanent or pagan 
substratum.”242 
This is an intriguing reinterpretation of the culture wars over 
public religious expression.  Although it will require an imaginative 
stretch for many readers, it is not without support.  It is true that 
the more openly sectarian a governmental expression is, the less 
likely it is to be upheld: and a sectarian expression, at least given 
the long history of Christianity in the United States, is more likely 
to be a transcendent one.  It is also true that the kinds of 
government religious expressions with which the Court is most 
comfortable are rendered acceptable in part by treating them as 
having “lost their religious significance” and serving a more 
general solemnizing function.243  That does not necessarily make 
such statements expressions of immanent religiosity.  But it can 
be read as suggesting that whatever form of ostensibly “religious” 
sacralization is permitted, it does not include openly and explicitly 
transcendent forms of religiosity. 
Finally, it is clearly true that many forms of “civil religion” 
broadly understood—on which I have more to say below—are 
treated as uncontroversial by “Christians” and “pagans” alike.  
Thus, despite a polemical attack on any form of American civil 
religion that is openly religious and a purported rejection of “civil 
religion” tout court, Frederick Gedicks asserts that “[o]ne can fall 
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in love with human dignity, with freedom of speech, with equal 
opportunity, and even with the separation of church and state.”244  
Although he describes this position as “abandoning the religious 
part [of civil religion] and retaining the civil part,”245 it is hard to 
describe this position as nonreligious, at least in Smith’s terms, 
and possible (although not necessary, as I argue below shortly) to 
think of it in terms of immanent religiosity. 
So there is something to Smith’s heterodox account.  One 
might round it out by asking the same questions I pursued in the 
first two parts of this Essay:  What does the dispute over religious 
symbols and expressions look like from the perspective of 
competing dispensations?  And what compromises or offers does 
each side make to the other from the commanding heights that it 
occupies, or seeks to occupy?  A relatively simple story can be told 
here. 
For the “Christian” or “transcendent” dispensation, the 
entrenchment of transcendent religious symbols does not demand 
the elimination of competing secular or immanent symbols.  For 
one thing, both Christians and pagans are free to worship, as it 
were, at the altar of common-ground symbols such as the flag or the 
Constitution.  Civil religion itself, even if it remains transcendent, 
can be expanded to include a wider set of “communions”: mostly 
monotheistic, perhaps, but even that might be subject to 
negotiation.246  Indeed, Smith writes that “a central feature of any 
contemporary Christian society under conditions of modern 
pluralism is that it is unlikely to sponsor any official account of 
what transcendence is and requires—any official orthodoxy.”247  
Finally, from the perspective of the “Christian” dispensation, the 
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pagan is free to ignore the public religious symbol or 
expression.  Any obligations are limited to mere courtesies, such 
as standing, or unobtrusively staying seated at a public event, not 
as a form of obeisance but out of simple good manners.248 
This resembles, and is even less burdensome than, the ancient 
pagan suggestion that Christians who wanted to be good citizens 
need merely sprinkle a few grains of incense on the altar at public 
ceremonies without having to change their religious beliefs.  Like 
that compromise, however, as Smith recognizes, such public 
expressions “may have a more fundamental alienating effect” than 
the offeror recognizes, and thus one may anticipate resistance to 
even a mild form of truly religious and transcendent civil 
religion.249 
For the “pagan” or “immanent” dispensation, the fact that 
transcendent religious symbols or displays are forbidden to 
government does not mean they must be eliminated from the 
public square, let alone the private sphere.  Churches and religious 
individuals need not hide the Light under a bushel.  Their 
architecture, signs, and statements can be as prominent and 
transcendently religious as they please.  They can, if they wish, 
imbue immanently sacred “secular” symbols with transcendent 
religiosity.  If pagans and Christians alike can “fall in love with” 
the display of the Constitution at the National Archives, then 
Christians can go further and see in it the guiding hand of 
Providence.  At least in the United States, it is unlikely that the 
rise of immanence and decline of transcendence will forbid 
government workers from wearing yarmulkes, turbans, hijabs, or 
crucifixes, as other governments have advocated.250  Leaving aside 
the most ardent separationists, whose arguments are routinely 
rejected by judges, many pagans would agree that a political 
candidate or office-holder can even make deeply religious, but 
officially personal, public statements.  In exchange for this 
largesse, “Christians” must merely accept that the symbols and  
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messages of their deepest commitments are permanently barred 
from taking a place in our array of public symbols and rituals.  
They must give up the Altar of Victory. 
From the pagan perspective, that is not asking much.  But 
given the depth of commitment of some religious believers, their 
view that they are uniquely shut out from expressing some beliefs 
through official public action, along with the fact that such 
symbols “help to constitute and define the community” of which 
they are a part, makes it understandable that they may resist this 
settlement.251  Thus, the story Smith tells about religious symbols, 
like his story of religious accommodation, can indeed be told in 
terms of competing Christian and pagan dispensations, the 
compromises each would offer, and the reasons each side might 
reject that offer, which in turn encourages the dynamic of conflict 
described above. 
I have thus far offered a mostly descriptive and fairly 
supportive description of Smith’s argument.  I have suggested that 
his account of disputes over public religious symbols is consistent 
with his larger narrative of a contest between would-be pagan and 
Christian dispensations and that this account has some power to 
illuminate our current disputes.  That said, I am much more 
dubious about this account than I am about his application of the 
same framework to the accommodation debate.  There is nothing 
wrong as such with “an artificial imposition” of an interpretation 
“upon a complex and messy reality.”252  But too schematic or 
artificial a vision may lend more coherence to events and ideas 
than is warranted, and thus offer a false sense of clarity.  I worry 
that this may be true here.  I explore this concern in two steps, 
first asking questions about the “civil religion” framework that 
animates much of Smith’s discussion and then asking directly 
about the law of public religious symbols. 
“Civil religion” is a complex term with no single definition.253  
In broad terms, it can be said to “refer[ ] to the widely held body of 
beliefs that are tied to the nation’s history and destiny.  Although 
it possesses no formal creed, it is a kind of generic faith that relates 
the political society as well as the individual citizen to the realm 
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of ultimate meaning and existence.254  But what it means to call it 
a “faith,” and how to define the term “civil” or identify the nature 
of the “religiosity” at work, are fraught questions.255 
Smith’s discussion of civil religion adopts the definition 
employed by Robert Bellah: “that religious dimension, found I 
think in the life of every people, through which it interprets its 
historical experience in the light of transcendent reality.”256  This 
is a reasonable choice: Berger is one of the most influential writers 
on civil religion, and his definition is widely used.  His work is also 
conveniently congenial to Smith’s thesis.  Drawing on Bellah’s 
definition allows Smith to emphasize the idea of civil religion as 
grounded in “a transcendent religiosity.”257  He notes that Berger’s 
definition supports the transcendent understanding of religion 
because it is based on “a species of Christianity, or at least a 
biblically based form of public religion.”258 
Berger’s is not the only available understanding of civil 
religion, however.259  For one thing, civil religion includes not only 
religious ceremonies that have been woven into the fabric of our 
national identity but also nonreligious ceremonies and concepts—
a whole “system of rituals, symbols, values, norms, and 
allegiances”—that help invest our national identity with common 
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ties of creedal and sentimental significance.260  A more secular and 
immanent vision of civil religion defines it as a “democratic 
egalitarian faith,” under which “[t]he humane values of equality, 
freedom, and justice can exist and be affirmed without depending 
on a transcendent deity or a spiritualized nation.”261  Indeed, a 
variety of definitions and distinctions have been offered for civil 
religion, not all of which emphasize the transcendent.262 
To be sure, the presence of such definitions supports Smith’s 
description of the revival of immanent or pagan understandings of 
“the city” and its practices.  Indeed, one critical discussion of 
contemporary civil religion might be especially pleasing to Smith, 
insofar as it is strikingly similar to much of his book’s broader 
description of current trends in modern “paganism.”  Walter 
McDougall writes that such a 
new civil religion will be spiritual inasmuch as it pays lip service 
to a godhead with no qualities whatsoever except to be 
ecumenical, androgynous, nurturing, and affirming.  It will be 
humanitarian to the point that it even suppresses freedoms of 
speech, assembly, and religion in the name of therapeutic 
equality.263 
But the presence of competing visions of civil religion itself, 
some more immanent and some more transcendent, also 
complicates any clear story here.  That complexity increases when 
it becomes clear that they do not march in neat chronological order 
from transcendent to immanent, but vary in prominence at 
different times, sometimes coexisting and sometimes competing.264 
The complexity increases still further when we consider that 
both immanent and transcendent versions of civil religion can take 
many forms265 and contain internal tensions, conflicts, and 
contradictions.  Barack Obama, whose political success and positions 
on social issues are treated by Smith as “victories for the devotees of 
immanence,”266 also “drench[ed] his presidency in civil religion,”267 
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including transcendent religiosity.  At least until it became 
politically inconvenient, he worshipped under a pastor with a 
distinctly prophetic conception of God’s interaction with the nation 
and the world.268  Both transcendent and immanent civil religion 
can end up compromised, neither offering a standard “by which to 
judge [and justify] the nation” nor constituting us as a whole 
“people.”269  McDougall argues that American civil religion, 
whether immanent or transcendent, often ends up striking Devil’s 
bargains, allowing Americans “to feel good about doing well.”270  It 
is hard to see this longstanding version of civil religion as saying 
much about a sacredness that lies “outside the world.”271  Finally, 
it is hardly clear what direction American civil religion is taking.  
Despite the seeming rise of paganism or immanent religiosity, 
Donald Trump, a “secular, worldly” figure, offered “by far the most 
spiritually drenched [inauguration] in the 228 years of the 
presidency.”272  Given our unsettled culture and politics, it is 
unclear which of the many past “dispensation[s]” of American civil 
religion might re-emerge or what form a new one might take.273 
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These complexities do not all contradict Smith’s arguments.  
But they suggest that our messy reality cannot be captured by the 
simple picture he paints of civil religion.  We need not take Berger 
as offering the authoritative definition of civil religion.  Had Smith 
chosen a different one, it would be harder to draw a stark 
distinction between transcendent and immanent versions of civil 
religion and to depict the latter as a new or revived competitor 
with the former.  Rather than attempt to arrive at a single 
definition, one might instead emphasize the competing conceptions 
of civil religion, their historical contingency, and the ways in which 
different conceptions and definitions mix as well as compete.  Or 
one might conclude that civil religion defies definition.  Under any 
of these approaches, it is harder to speak about a neat Christian-
pagan or transcendent-immanent contest over civil religion. 
What of the law with respect to public religious symbols?  
Recall that Smith’s thesis is that “[i]n prohibiting endorsements 
of ‘religion,’ the ‘no endorsement’ doctrine might mean that 
government is forbidden to endorse traditional or transcendent 
religion,” while “ ‘secular’ expressions of more immanent religiosity 
might be permissible.”274  “[G]eneric [religious] expressions,” 
sometimes including the invocation of God, that are “at least 
susceptible . . . of an immanent interpretation” are more likely to 
be upheld than expressions that are “more obviously sectarian” or 
transcendent.275 
It is true that the Court does not blink at public symbols, such 
as the display of the flag, that “stir citizens’ feelings of reverence 
and devotion.”276  It is equally true that courts are more likely to 
frown on openly sectarian governmental religious statements.  But 
does the transcendent-immanent distinction really capture what 
is going on in these cases? 
One problem here concerns judicial rhetoric.  How deeply should 
we read the Supreme Court’s statements on these questions?  Not 
very, surely.  The justices may write strategically, taking the sting 
out of something like a ruling striking down a flag-burning statute 
by offering a fulsome tribute to the flag.  They may write honestly 
but without much sincerity.  Or they may be sincere but shallow, 
throwing around evocative language without thinking much about 
its deeper implications.  A judicial robe is hardly proof against 
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shallowness.  And all this is true without even considering the role 
of law clerks, with their youth and callowness, in the writing 
process. 
To be sure, the culture in which judges live leaves its traces 
on the language they use, whether they mean it to or not.  
Nonetheless, one should avoid reading more meaning into their 
choice of words than really belongs there.  The justices may use 
terms like “sacred” or “consecrate” not falsely but casually, and 
certainly without any considered conclusions about the immanent 
or transcendent nature of sacredness.  We should generally be 
cautious about finding deeper social significance in what justices 
write, just as we should hesitate before drawing conclusions about 
musical genius and creative intention from the lowing of a 
particularly euphonious cow. 
Another problem lies between rhetoric and substance.  It is true 
that outright sectarianism in government speech or funding raises 
Establishment Clause problems.277  But it is not clear how much 
we can conclude about the cases that lie in the middle ground, the 
ones Smith focuses on.278  The proposition that government 
statements involving “more immanent religiosity might be 
permissible” may have less to do with the kind of religiosity 
involved than with the the bland, lowest-common-denominator 
nature of these statements.  Such statements can be consistent 
with either an immanent or a transcendent reading.279  In any 
case, they involve the kinds of symbols that, from the justices’ 
perspective, may seem both least objectionable and least worth 
spending judicial capital on, in the event that citizens are angered 
by a decision invalidating such a practice. 
It is true that court decisions upholding such practices often 
rely on rationales that minimize the religiosity of a statement or 
symbol.280  And it is understandable that these rationales will be 
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2019] A FEW GRAINS OF INCENSE 179 
“unconvincing both to serious nonbelievers and to serious 
believers.”281  But even those opinions in which justices offer secular 
justifications for religious symbols or displays often also contain 
statements that are more consistent with transcendent religiosity.  
They uphold particular religious statements or symbols not 
because they are secular or have been stripped of religious 
significance, but because they have both secular and religious 
significance.282  These opinions often focus on history.  But that 
does not necessarily mean they accept the public religious 
statements under dispute only as a historical statement or 
hallowed but secularized practice.  They also employ history in 
order to conclude—in a way that is consistent with transcendent 
religiosity—that “official references to the value and invocation of 
Divine guidance” are permissible whether the official was a long-
dead Framer or a “contemporary leader[ ].”283 
Thus, a justice who insists that holidays like Christmas and 
Chanukah must be celebrated as “secular holidays” for government 
to be involved may also acknowledge that those holidays necessarily 
have “both religious and secular dimensions.”284  Likewise, even 
when insisting that a cross in a war memorial is “intended simply 
to honor our Nation’s fallen soldiers,” the Court will acknowledge 
forthrightly that the cross is “certainly a Christian symbol.”285  
Although he rejected the proposition that the words “under God” 
make the Pledge of Allegiance a “religious exercise,” Chief Justice 
Rehnquist also emphasized that to some of “the millions of people  
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who regularly recite the Pledge,” the phrase could mean “that God 
has guided the destiny of the United States” or that “the United 
States exists under God’s authority.”286 
In sum, Smith is right that the Court has rejected outright 
sectarianism in government religious symbols.  He is right, too, 
that when the Court upholds such symbols it generally emphasizes 
the possibility of a “secular,” but still solemnizing or “sacred,” 
understanding of the symbol.  But, in keeping with the mixed 
nature of most such symbols, the Court has not always done so in 
ways that reject transcendent religiosity or require that a symbol 
have solely immanent significance.  I find it unlikely that the 
Court has reflected deeply on these distinctions in its judgments.  
But its language at least allows for transcendent understandings 
of constitutionally permissible public religious symbols, even if it 
requires that transcendent religiosity not be the sole or primary 
purpose or effect of these expressions. 
Finally, it is likely that the current Court will increasingly 
and more openly acknowledge the transcendent meaning of 
permitted government religious symbols.  Consider Town of Greece 
v. Galloway,287 in which the Court upheld a town board’s prayer 
practice.  As is typical of his jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy 
combined the central holding—that we must look to “historical 
practices and understandings” to determine the Establishment 
Clause’s meaning—with various side-constraints, such as that 
prayer policies should avoid a “course and practice” of 
“denigrat[ing] nonbelievers or religious minorities.”288  And he 
offered bland statements, consistent with immanent religiosity 
although not necessarily in conflict with transcendent religiosity, 
about the solemnizing and conciliatory function of legislative 
prayer.289  Nevertheless, the Court permitted long-established 
public religious symbols and practices on historical grounds alone, 
even though a practice might have been rooted in transcendent 
religiosity and many might still understand it that way; and it 
affirmed that some of those practices could include openly 
sectarian, transcendent statements.290 
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The historical approach is likely to take on a greater role in 
government religious display cases given recent personnel 
changes on the Supreme Court.291  If it does, it will free up the 
justices to acknowledge more frankly the transcendent religiosity 
of the government religious symbols and statements they uphold.  
They will be freer to reject Justice O’Connor’s arguments that 
religious displays can be approved only if they have been leeched 
of religious content and to insist instead that a religious statement 
can indeed be strongly religious, even if it has other purposes.292  I 
make no judgment here about whether this trend is good or bad.293  
My point is simply that it complicates Smith’s conclusion that the 
Court has “remove[d] the transcendent or Christian stratum of 
American civil religion.”294  At a minimum, I suspect his conclusion 
will have a short shelf life. 
Thus, while much of Smith’s account is illuminating, I fear 
that with respect to religious symbols, his “imposition” of order is 
too “artificial” to help make sense of the “complex and messy 
reality” we confront.295  It may be that the law in this area is messy 
because of the contest between dispensations that frames Smith’s 
project.  His account may help us see aspects of that contest that 
are hidden within the murk of the Court’s opinions.  But I doubt it 
can do more than that. 
I close this section, and offer a segue to the next and final 
part, with some observations on Smith’s provocative conclusion 
to his discussion of debates over “[s]ymbols, [s]ex, and the 
Constitution.”296  Smith argues that the symbols debate (and the 
debate over sexuality, which I have omitted here) is connected to 
a larger issue: “If the Constitution has been employed to make 
public symbols and sexual norms less Christian and more pagan, 
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the deployment of the Constitution for those ends has had the 
effect of making the Constitution itself a more pagan 
instrument.”297 
The Constitution, on his view, is not itself “an overtly 
Christian document.”298  Rather, it is agnostic, “deliberately 
avoid[ing] any meaningful acknowledgment” of a transcendent 
God—or a pagan immanent spirit, for that matter.299  Smith has 
written that the agnostic structure of the Constitution 
accomplished “what for centuries many had thought impossible—
namely, to take a mass of individuals and groups embracing a 
multitude of different faiths and, without suppressing their 
differences, to hold them together as a single community.”300  Now, 
however, the “pagan” legal turn with respect to religious symbols, 
along with changes in the legal status of “Christian norms of 
sexual morality and marriage,” has rendered the Constitution 
neither agnostic nor “Christian” but pagan.301  Smith paints the 
result in technically neutral but distinctly dire terms: 
In doing so, for better or worse, the Court has transformed the 
nation’s most fundamental law—one that once stood majestically 
above the fray of contesting religious and secular conceptions of 
the community, and hence could serve as an anchor for the 
allegiance even of citizens who found themselves in the situation 
of being a political or cultural or religious minority—into a 
partisan instrument in the struggle between transcendent and 
immanent conceptions of the city.302 
Notwithstanding the seeming neutrality of “for better or 
worse,” it is hard to read this as anything other than a lament.  
And it raises the obvious question: Was the Constitution ever, in 
theory or in practice, “above the fray”?  How could it possibly 
regain a position above the fray today?  And how does this thesis, 
along with the lament for the lost agnosticism of the Constitution, 
comport with Smith’s broader argument? 
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Skepticism about laments like this usually focuses on the 
present.  No matter what golden age of consensus we once enjoyed, 
the skeptic says, conditions of pluralism and polarization today 
make real common ground impossible.  But we might just as easily 
ask whether the Constitution was ever in this happy position.  
Even in his short account here, Smith notes that “a faction” during 
the drafting and ratification period “wanted to acknowledge 
Christianity in the nation’s fundamental law,” and that the post-
Civil War period saw competing constitutional amendments that 
would have made the Constitution either explicitly secular or 
explicitly Christian.303  And a longer account of American history 
would record many “ugly, even violent” acts of religious repression, 
contestation, combat, and bigotry.304  Both the proposed 
constitutional amendments and the legal disputes that ensued 
once the Religion Clauses became a matter for judicial review 
suggest that the Constitution was always a part of this contest.  
Can we then really say that it was ever “majestically above the 
fray”? 
Could we say it today?  The value of the agnostic Constitution, 
Smith argues, is that although “almost all Americans would in 
different times and circumstances find themselves out of harmony 
with positions taken by national, state, or local governments,” they 
would at least have the comfort of an overarching agnostic 
Constitution that refuses “to put its imprimatur on either 
Christian or secular (or pagan) conceptions of the community.”305  
But his reference to a “struggle between transcendent and 
immanent conceptions of the city” reminds us that “the city” in any 
given era is not a clearly demarked territory but a label for the 
reigning authority and the scope of its power.306  Nationalizing 
forces in culture, politics, and media, quite apart from any legal 
developments, have pushed us toward a conception of our “city” as 
the entire nation—as a singular The United States.307  Under those 
conditions, it seems natural that the nation as a whole will be the 
subject of partisan contestation between Christians and pagans,  
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or between transcendent and immanent views in the American 
“city.”  As its governing law, the Constitution will inevitably be a 
part of that contest. 
This view seems more consistent with Smith’s general 
narrative.  Pagans and Christians in the City is the story of a 
“recurring” and “centuries-long struggle” stemming from the fact 
that each offered compromises the other side could not accept, 
leading to “a struggle for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural 
and political community and the self-conception by which the 
community constitutes and governs itself.”308  If he is right about 
that, it seems hard to believe that the Constitution ever was, or 
could be today, above the fray.  Surely it was always subject to 
being a partisan instrument in the recurring battle.  Even if one 
accepts Smith’s historical description, the longue durée 
perspective he offers in this book encourages us to view any 
momentary harmony as a brief pause in a longer conflict.  If his 
book as a whole suggests anything, surely it is that if the 
Constitution ever was above the fray, that was the exception.  Its 
current status as a field of combat is the norm we ought to expect. 
CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL DYNAMIC OF THE 
“CHRISTIAN-PAGAN STRUGGLE” 
In this Essay, I have glossed Smith’s book mostly on its own 
terms and argued that it offers insight into our ongoing and vexing 
struggles over religious liberty, on and off the courts.  If its use of 
the “Christian” and “pagan” labels is deliberately provocative, it is 
also instructive, at least if one keeps in mind Smith’s broad 
definitions of those terms.  Although I am less convinced by his 
application of the Christian-pagan or transcendent-immanent 
distinction to the debate over religious symbols and civil religion 
than by his application of that distinction to the religious 
accommodation debate, both are unquestionably useful.  They 
offer a new lens with which to view culture-war conflicts that are 
real, but whose terms can become so tired and familiar as to arrest 
one’s understanding rather than advance it. 
If I have added anything new to Smith’s account from this 
more or less internal perspective, it is to provide a more detailed 
description of the dynamic of offer and refusal, counteroffer and 
counter-refusal, and conflict that Smith identifies first in the 
 
308 SMITH, supra note 1, at 1, 130–31, 265. 
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ancient Christian-pagan battle and then again in our own times.309  
It is worth quoting Smith again.  In both eras, each side in the 
culture wars takes its turn as the reigning dispensation.  From 
that position, it “[holds] out terms of mutual accommodation that 
seem[ ] fair and reasonable to them, but that for discernible 
reasons [are] not . . . accepted by the other side.”310  That each side 
at some point is, or seeks to be, not just a side but a ruling 
dispensation, and that the conflict has as much to do with the 
compromises that are offered as with a more fundamental clash of 
positions, are both neglected insights into the present culture 
wars. 
One value in drawing on the ancient Christian-pagan struggle 
to understand this dynamic is that, for most of us, that past is 
distant enough for one to feel little emotional identification with 
either side.311  From a disinterested perspective, one can see that 
each side thought of itself as offering a reasonable and acceptable 
compromise.  Each side, whether in or out of power, understood 
itself to be seeking a “peaceful coexistence [that] should be possible 
on fair and mutually acceptable terms.”312  It did so by offering 
what it saw as a compromise that—from its perspective—asked 
relatively little of the other side: just a few grains of incense.  It 
saw its own actions not as “gratuitously vindictive or malicious” 
but as fair and reasonable.313  The very fact that the other side—
understandably and reasonably, from that perspective—saw the 
offer as unacceptable fueled a sense that it was the other side that 
was foolish, malicious, and potentially dangerous.  Faced with 
what looks from one’s own perspective like an “inflexible, 
dogmatic” group, it is natural to conclude that the other side is 
“undeserving of accommodation”: so unlikely to be satisfied with 
any offer that there is little use in trying.314 
It is natural that the logic of persecution should follow from 
such premises.  It is natural, too, that the result is “a struggle 
for ‘domination’—for control of the cultural and political 
 
309 See id. at 130–31. 
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186 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 58:125   
community.”315  Nor, given the importance of the perceived stakes 
and the ways in which a dominant culture will permeate all 
manner of public and private customs and institutions, is it 
surprising that these battles should not only occur within 
particular borders—such as the official apparatus of the “city”—
but also include battles over the borders themselves: over what is 
public and what is private. 
Two millennia is perhaps not enough time to get full 
emotional distance from these disputes.  But it is a start.  That 
distance may help us understand our own times and our own 
conflicts better.  That is so not just in the sense, ably pursued by 
Smith in his book, that we are facing many of the same struggles 
over the same issues: over “Christianity” and “transcendence,” 
broadly conceived, and “paganism” and “immanence.”  It is also 
true in that the ancient contest between the pagans and the 
Christians better helps us understand the dynamics of modern-
day struggles for cultural dominance. 
Not least, it may help us to understand these dynamics more 
sympathetically.  Observing the ultimate failures of mutual 
understanding in the ancient struggle, we may be slower to see our 
side as reasonable and the other side as stubborn, calculating, and 
undeserving of accommodation.  We may accept the possibility 
that our opponents are acting in good faith from their perspective.  
We may see that despite good faith, each side fails “fully to grasp 
and credit the other side’s commitments,” and thus offers 
“reasonable” compromises—surrendering the ability to fully 
honor one’s deep religious commitments, on the one hand, or 
accepting less than the full measure of dignity and equality that is 
every person’s right, on the other—that are understandably 
unacceptable.316  We may thus better understand the dynamic of 
conflict and power struggle that ensues. 
None of this provides an answer.  Maybe there is none to be 
had.  “[C]onflict is the name of our condition, and moreover, 
naming it does nothing to ameliorate it or make it easier to 
negotiate.”317  Even recognizing that the other side is reasonable 
by its own lights and is offering a sincere compromise will not 
make that compromise any more palatable if it fails to grasp our 
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deep commitments and demands more than we can give.  One may 
conclude that the other side is reasonable and acting in good faith 
and still believe just as strongly that the only answer is to win, 
although Smith’s history suggests that it won’t be a final victory.  
Winning is, after all, “like, better than losing.”318  For scholars and 
noncombatants, however, there may be at least some value in 
naming and understanding our condition.  Even some of the 
combatants may approach the field of battle differently if they 
understand it better. 
In that spirit, two aspects of the dynamic of the Christian-
pagan conflict that are not covered by Smith are worth exploring.  
Both are descriptive.  Neither is especially hopeful.  Indeed, the 
second point suggests that the field of conflict is even wider than 
the one Smith depicts in his book.  Still, both may help us 
understand the current conflict better. 
First, we might add further detail and nuance to the 
dynamics, or political economy, of the conflict Smith describes.  
The picture I draw is itself an effort to impose an interpretation on 
a “complex and messy reality.”319  To the extent that it gets things 
right, however, it adds detail to the general story Smith tells.320 
Consider, then, the question whether and why any of the 
compromises described in Smith’s book were ever acceptable to 
both sides.321  At a minimum, it seems true that some periods of 
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church-state, or Christian-pagan, relations in American history 
seem to have been calmer and less conflict-ridden than others.322  
Sometimes, in other words, the compromises offered by the ruling 
dispensation seem to have been accepted and to have worked 
relatively well.  At other times, that compromise is rejected, both 
sides are at loggerheads, and the broader culture is characterized 
more by conflict than by common ground.  Why are some periods 
relatively successful in keeping the peace while others—arguably 
including our own—are not? 
Despite considerable literature on law and social change, our 
discussion of these issues often focuses “on the longer temporal 
sweep of social and legal development” while giving us too little 
information about the nature of those moments within “the life 
cycle of social and legal change,” in which particular issues move 
from being relatively uncontested to a state of “foregrounded 
contestation.”323  It tells us too little about the moves, mechanisms, 
institutions, and incentives of those moments of deep contestation: 
in short, about the political economy of moments such as this one. 
I would argue that periods of relatively successful compromise 
are most likely under two conditions.  The first is unsurprising.  
Peace is more likely to prevail when one side has most of the power 
and represents the shared views of both most of the people and 
most of the elites who are in a position to offer and enforce 
compromises.  The need for consensus between the people and the 
governing elites is an especially important factor that has 
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garnered considerable attention of late.324  Where there is 
widespread public consensus and that consensus is shared by 
those who are in a position to justify (or rationalize), enforce, and 
entrench it, the ruling dispensation is more likely to succeed.  It 
may offer a relatively thin compromise, and the compromise may 
seem reasonable only to the party in power, but the history Smith 
provides suggests that it will put something on the table. 
The second condition under which compromise succeeds may 
be more surprising.  It is more possible at moments when neither 
dispensation is securely in power and neither side is certain who 
will win.  When one side is certain that it is about to achieve a 
strong political victory, taking a “hard line” may seem like a viable 
and attractive approach.325  By contrast, when it is uncertain 
which dispensation will prevail, compromise may be preferable to 
uncertainty and there will be greater incentive to find a common-
ground solution.326  Although the point is rarely put directly, it 
clearly has mattered in recent culture-war arguments.  Many 
recent discussions of free exercise law and the possibility of 
legislative compromise between between religious liberty and 
LGBTQ rights have focused on the question whether compromise 
is still possible, or whether changes in the legal and cultural 
consensus have rendered compromise less necessary and less 
attractive.327  If the battle for power has much to do with the desire 
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to be the side offering the compromise rather than the one faced 
with the choice whether to accept it or not, then not knowing who 
will be the offeror and who will be the offeree is a good moment for 
some kind of negotiated settlement. 
Each type of peace—the peace made possible by the certainty 
that one holds power, and the peace made necessary because 
neither side knows who will hold power—is different and will 
result in different forms of compromise.  But each provides the 
possibility of some stability and calm, however momentary.  When 
the moment passes, we can expect the conflict to take on a fiercer 
and more uncompromising cast. 
The current moment looks unpromising, despite the relative 
uncertainty presented by the division between elites and 
populists, the sudden shift in power in 2016, and uncertainty 
about whether and when it will suddenly shift again.  The reason 
has much to do with the political economy of our current debates.  
We are arguably in a period of uncertainty about who will win.  
This suggests that compromise ought to be possible and attractive.  
But each side has strong incentives to argue that we are actually 
in the first type of situation—the situation in which one side is 
clearly dominant—and that it is the party in the driver’s seat.  
Each side thus argues that the other side should accept whatever 
compromise it may deign to offer. 
For the “pagans,” that means “Christians” will have some 
religious freedom, especially the freedom to believe and, within 
“reason,” practice what they wish in the private and noncommercial 
sphere but subject to the constraints of antidiscrimination law and 
other legal regimes.  Conversely, the “Christians” invite the 
“pagans” to accept their victories on issues such as same-sex 
marriage while accepting the right of business owners and others 
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to refuse to provide service to some customers, to subsidize 
contraceptive services, and so on.  Whatever the actual balance of 
power may be, each side has a strong incentive to describe itself as 
holding the reins, and thus to insist that it need not accept the 
compromise offered by the other side but in fact is in a position to 
offer the compromise of its choice. 
A variety of factors encourage this state of affairs.  For one 
thing, there is arguably not one “city” but two.  Each side occupies 
its own citadel.  Because of physical sorting, online balkanization, 
and radically different information sources,328 each side is 
convinced that it occupies the “real” city, the “real America,” and 
that the other side is in no position to bargain.  This conviction is 
reinforced by through both online and offline discussion.  Each side 
offers ever more strategic and rhetorically tilted narratives and 
arguments, seeking to galvanize its own side rather than persuade 
the other.329  It is enhanced by electoral politics.  That includes the 
work of interest groups, which naturally want to gain or retain 
influence and raise money.  Everyone today who receives mail 
from candidates, parties, or interest groups is familiar with the 
standard pitch, which argues simultaneously that they are on the 
verge of a great victory and that this victory is in mortal peril (and 
thus in desperate need of a donation). 
In short, each side has every incentive to argue that it is 
always almost winning and always gravely threatened.  Each side 
encourages its adherents to believe that they are the ones who 
have won, or are about to win, the culture wars and that their 
adversaries are unreasonable, unprincipled, and pose a clear 
threat.  Under these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the 
struggle for “control of the cultural and political community” not 
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only persists but has grown more bitter.330  The political economy 
of the modern culture war has made it a perpetual motion 
machine.  Things always change.  But the current dynamics of our 
institutions and debates offer little reason to hope they will change 
any time soon. 
The argument here is meant to add detail and nuance to 
Smith’s broader narrative of the recurring conflict between 
“Christians” and “pagans.”  It uses a microscope to augment 
Smith’s generally telescopic treatment.  And I would add one 
further detail to that picture.  In focusing on the constitutive value 
of symbols and their role in “battles over who we are,” Smith 
focuses mostly on religious symbols.331  He argues that they are 
especially important because “religious expressions may have a more 
fundamental alienating effect than other sorts of controversial 
public statements typically have.”332 
If that was ever the case, it may no longer be.  Increasingly, 
at least in legal scholarship, the field of battle has expanded to 
take in other statements and symbols.  An argument gaining 
steam among some writers on (and participants in) the broader 
culture wars suggests that the Constitution “imposes a broad 
principle of government nonendorsement,” under which 
constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause, 
taken in combination with the First Amendment, should be read 
as “prohibit[ing] any [government] endorsement that abridges full 
and equal citizenship in a free society.”333  At a minimum,334 this is 
an argument for limitations on any government speech that 
undermines the Constitution’s “[c]ommitments to full citizenship, 
equal citizenship, and the maintenance of a free society.”335  
Claims of this sort are quickly becoming more visible and popular 
in American constitutional scholarship.336 
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This development is consistent with Marc DeGirolami’s recent 
suggestion that given “the common theological, political, and 
cultural assumptions prevalent in American society across time,” 
and the relation of both freedom of speech and freedom of religion 
to that larger “social superstructure,” it is natural that both 
ultimately follow the same course of development—and that, in 
our own time, “the rights of free speech and religious liberty are 
likely to suffer similar fates.”337  The same disputes that have been 
so salient in law and religion in recent years are likely to recur in 
the area of free speech.  Indeed, we have already seen a “migration 
of the ‘weaponization’ accusation from religious freedom to free 
speech over only a short span of years.”338  Likewise, as the 
government nonendorsement scholarship suggests, we are 
witnessing the application of the Establishment Clause–centered 
idea that some religious expressions have a “fundamental 
alienating effect” across a wider field of government speech.339 
This should not be surprising, given the argument of Smith’s 
book.  If public symbols are understood to be “expressive and 
constitutive not just of particular private speakers and groups, but 
of the community,” and thus part of a broader “battle[ ] over who 
we are,” then it makes sense that our disputes over symbols will 
take in more ground than religion alone.340  If our debates over 
religion have increasingly emphasized expressive and dignitary 
harms,341 then it is unsurprising that people may come to believe 
that other government statements and symbols are also 
“fundamental[ly] alienating”342 and equally deserving of legal 
redress.  Moreover, if Smith is right in seeing a movement to 
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expand the walls of the “city” so that things once thought of as 
belonging to the “private sphere” are now part of the “public 
domain,” then we can expect these battles over other symbols to 
embrace not only government speech but also speech within the 
marketplace.343  And so we have, as fights over statues on campus, 
taking a knee at professional football games, and objectionable 
speech by corporate executives and others all demonstrate. 
The legal and cultural war over symbols is thus unlikely to 
stop with religious symbols alone.  Our civil religion and the fights 
over it have always included a wider range of values, symbols, 
rituals, and norms than just the narrowly religious.  The struggle 
for power, including the power to define ourselves as a community, 
that Smith describes in the area of religion is ultimately part of a 
broader battle for control over our symbolic and discursive space 
in general.  As large as it is, Smith’s canvas may not be large 
enough.  We should expect more of the same.  We cannot know 
whether the “city” will become “pagan” or “Christian” or for how 
long.  All we can expect is that it will continue to be hotly contested 
ground. 
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